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Chapter 1
Chapter Introduction
1.1 Intrusion
In computer and communication systems, an intrusion is referred to an attempt to
break-in to an information system or performing an illegal activity. Intrusions are
also referred to as anomalies, outliers, discordant observations, exceptions, aberra-
tions, surprises, peculiarities, or contaminants in different application domains.
There are two general categories of intruders: external and internal. The external
intruders are those who have no authorized access to the system and who attack
by using various penetration techniques. On the other hand, the internal intruders
have access (permission) to the system and they perform unauthorized activities.
1
21.2 Intrusion Detection Systems
Intrusion detection refers to the problem of finding patterns in a data-set (off-line
environment) which do not conform to expected or normal behavior of the network
or are known to be malicious in nature. Intrusion detection is of extensive use in a
variety of applications such as fraud detection for credit cards, insurance and health
care, malware detection and fault detection in computer networks and even in mil-
itary surveillance for enemy activities. Intrusion detection techniques are different
for different domains and applications.
An Intrusion Detection System (IDS) is installed as software or a physical device
that monitors network traffic in order to detect unwanted activity and events and
reports them accurately to the proper authority. Misuse detection and anomaly
detection are two main classes of intrusion detection techniques.
Misuse detection models look for a pattern of malicious behavior, and behavior that
fits this model is classified as malicious. Anomaly detection refers to the problem
of finding patterns in data-set that does not conforms to expected or normal be-
havior. Anomaly detection is of extensive use in a variety of applications such as
fraud detection for credit cards, insurance and health care, intrusion detection and
fault detection in computer networks and even in military surveillance for enemy
activities. Anomaly detection techniques are different for different domains and ap-
plications.
3Intrusion detection techniques can be further classified into two categories based on
where they look for malicious behavior. Network Based Intrusion Detection System
(NIDS) and Host Based Intrusion Detection System (HIDS). Network based sys-
tems identify malicious behavior through network devices such as network interface
cards and analyze network events such as protocol information, traffic volume, IP
addresses, etc. where as host based systems monitor files, process identifiers, op-
erating system related calls and activities related to specific hosts. Honeypots are
among the widely used host based systems which are specifically designed to study
intruders and intrusive activities. It appears as a target to the intruder and helps
in tracking its location and responding to attacks [1].
The efficiency of a intrusion detection system is defined by the following three pa-
rameters:
1. Speed: The speed or the execution time refers to the time an IDS takes to
decide whether the connection is anomalous or normal. Execution time is a
very important parameter for any IDS. The faster a system detects an intrusion
the more efficient it is and lesser is the damage caused by an attack. For non-
real time systems where network log files are examined (e.g. for the past day),
a system execution time of hours is acceptable; but in real time services this
execution time is not acceptable. For real time applications, a quick system is
required which detects an anomalous connection before it causes any kind of
damage to the network system.
4Figure 1.1: IDS characteristics
2. Accuracy: The accuracy of an IDS is a measure of how well a system clas-
sifies network connections. This classification rate depends on the number of
true/false positives/negatives. The lesser the number of false alarms generated
by the IDS the more accurate it is.
3. Adaptability: The adaptability of an IDS is its ability to adapt to detect
new intrusions. It is a well known fact that new computer intrusions (attacks)
evolve almost daily. Systems can guarantee perfect protection from the attacks
5whose signatures are well known today. But for the new attacks of tomorrow
if the system is not adaptable, the system will be vulnerable to those attacks
and will not be able to ensure complete security. Therefore, the IDS should
be able to adapt to protect against new attacks as well.
Figure 1.1 shows a more detailed classification of intrusion detection systems.
1.3 Genetic Algorithm
Genetic algorithm (GA) is a powerful domain independent search technique that is
based on principles of evolution and natural selection. GAs were first introduced by
John Holland and his colleagues in the early 1970s. In computer security applica-
tions, it is mainly used for finding optimal solutions to a specific problem. [2]
The process of a genetic algorithm usually begins with a randomly selected popu-
lation of chromosomes. These chromosomes are representations of the problem to
be solved. According to the attributes of the problem, different positions of each
chromosome are encoded as bits, characters, or numbers. In addition, each chro-
mosome is characterized by a fitness function which implies that chromosomes with
higher fitness values will lead to a better solution making the selection process bi-
ased towards the fittest chromosomes. The fitness of a chromosome is calculated by
an evaluation function or a fitness function. During evaluation, two basic operators,
crossover and mutation, are used to simulate the natural reproduction and mutation
6of species.[2, 3]
In the crossover process, two parents are combined to produce two offsprings. How-
ever, it is possible that the chromosomes of two parents are copied unmodified as
offspring. There is also a possibility that the chromosomes of the two parents are
randomly combined (crossover) to form an offspring. The mutation process ran-
domly changes the value of a gene from its present state to an entirely distinct one.
[2, 3]
1.4 Network Intrusion Detection and Genetic Al-
gorithm
A network IDS collects traffic based information that traverses a network. This
information is then fed to a rule generator which creates a set of rules for detection
of attacks. As the requirement of our system is to develop a more evolved rule set for
intrusion detection, a signature of a known attack is converted into a chromosome.
A set of such chromosomes are provided to the system as initial population and the
test set is searched based on it. In the first generation only attacks represented by
the chromosomes of initial generation are detected. In the subsequent generation
these chromosomes are evolved using crossover and mutation. With the evolved rule
set, the intrusion detection system continues to function as before but it now has
added capability to block the malicious network activity.
71.5 Thesis Objective
The objective of this thesis work is to develop a network intrusion detection scheme
using reverse engineering for feature selection and an iterative heuristic such as
genetic algorithm. The anomalous network connection are reverse engineered using
feature selection methods and comparison with normal connections. The network
intrusion detection system should be able to detect a good number of attacks and
also should be able to keep the number of false alarms as low as possible.
1.6 Thesis Organization
The first chapter presents a general introduction. The second chapter covers the
problem description. The third chapter presents a literature survey of intrusion
detection systems. In the fourth chapter attacks of the NSL-KDD data set are
explained. The fifth chapter explains the system implementation. In chapter six,
feature selection techniques such as chisquare and filtereed attribute and filtered
subset evaluation techniques are used for network intrusion detection. Chapter
seven provides a detailed description on reverse engineering for feature selection and
application of genetic algorithm in network intrusion detection. Finally in chapter
eight the thesis in concluded and future directions are provided.
Chapter 2
Problem Description
2.1 Classification Problem
Classification is a problem of putting (classifying) each data instance or data record
in a particular class. In a dataset the class is indicated by the goal attribute. The
attributes can be discrete/continuous or symbolic values depending on the type of
data and application domain. The data instances consist of two parts, a set of
predictor attribute values and a goal attribute value. The goal attribute is usually
the class of the data row. These attribute values are used to predict the class for
unseen data. These data instances can be called an object, case, record, tuple or a
connection. The attributes which define these records are called features or variables
[4, 5]. For example if we have squares, triangles, pentagons and octagons in a sample
space then the classification problem will be to identify the number of sides of the
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9shape and then put all the similar shapes under the same category. Then all the
squares will be placed together. Similarly all the other shapes will be classified.
The classification problem involves two mutually exclusive data sets or instances,
one is called the training data set which is completely made available to the data
mining algorithms so that the algorithms have access to both the predictor attributes
and the goal attribute values for each data instance. The other set of data is called
the test set which may or may not contain the goal attribute value.
In intrusion detection all the attacks should be detected correctly so that the required
action can be taken to limit or prevent their effect. On the other hand all the normal
connections should be allowed to pass through the system un affected.
The aim of data mining algorithm is to develop or discover relationships between the
predictor attributes and the goal attribute values using the training set only. The
discovered relationships are then used to predict the class of all the data instances in
the test set. On a labelled test set, the goal attribute is used to verify the accuracy
of prediction for the classified data instances. If the predicted class is the same as
the actual class, then the prediction is correct. And the prediction is not correct if
the predicted class is different than the actual class of the data instance.
The main aim of the data mining algorithm is to maximize the classification accuracy
in the test set, as achieving high classification accuracy on the training set can be
considered as a trivial task. The prediction accuracy is defined as the number of
correct predictions divided by the total number (correct + incorrect) of predictions.
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PredictionAccuracy =
Number of CorrectPredictions
TotalNumber of Predictions
(2.1)
The discovered relationships are generally formulated as IF-Then rules. The
conditional attributes become antecedent and the goal attributes constitute the
consequents.
In a geometric representation, the goal of the classification algorithm is to find lines
or curves that separate the data instances of the other classes. A simple example in
a two dimensional space is shown below. As the number of independent variables in
a data instance increase the number of dimensions in the geometric graph increase
and the problem of finding those lines or curves become difficult. An example of
this geometric representation is shown in figure 2.1
Figure 2.1: Classification geometric representation
The classification problem mainly comprises of following steps:
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1. The data mining algorithm extracts some knowledge from the “training set”.
2. The extracted rules are tested on the “test set”and the prediction accuracy is
calculated.
3. Define how to classify data instances unknown to the algorithm i.e. data
instances for which no relationships and rules were developed. A possibility is
to use the existing data (training + test sets) as new training sets and develop
rules to classify new data which was previously unknown.
2.2 Genetic Algorithm for rule discovery
In the genetic algorithm, each individual corresponds to a candidate solution to a
given problem. In the problem of discovering prediction rules for intrusion detection,
generally we are interested in a set of rules rather than a single golden rule. This is
due to huge diversities in different types of attacks and their corresponding features.
There are two different approaches for rule development with genetic algorithm.
1. Pittsburg approach: In this approach, each individual of the GA population
represents a set of prediction rules, i.e. an entire candidate solution. The
fitness function measures the rule set as a whole. This approach executes in a
longer time because in any given generation there are more rules to be matched
against the data set being mined.
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2. Michigan approach: In this approach, an individual represents a single
rule i.e. a part of the candidate solution. This approach is also referred
to as classifier systems. In this approach, the fitness function measures the
performance of a single rule out of the context of the other rules. This approach
accounts for the discovery of a set of good rules rather than a single best rule.
2.2.0.1 Rule Encoding
When using genetic algorithms, the main task is the encoding of solutions. This is
the part of the problem formulation and also is an important factor in the efficiency
and results of the problem being solved. Following are the viable techniques for
encoding:
1. Binary Encoding: All the parameters are encoded in s binary form. The
technique depends on the number and kind of attributes and their correspond-
ing values.
2. Low level Encoding: Attribute values are encoded directly into the genome.
3. Threshold based encoding: Attribute thresholds (upper, lower, or both)
are encoded into the genome.
4. Hybrid Encoding: Encode the genome using the combination of the above
mentioned techniques.
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2.3 Problem Description
Intrusion detection falls into the category of classification problems where each net-
work connection in the data set (in academic research), network log files (for passive
systems) or real time environment has to be correctly classified as a malicious net-
work connection (intrusion/attack) or a normal connection. Most of the approaches
for intrusion detection aim to develop rules for intrusive connections and then search
for a pattern match. The problem of intrusion detection is to develop such rules
which accurately classify all the intrusions and normal connections.
As this thesis is targeted on the data set (KDD99/NSL-KDD) using genetic algo-
rithm for rule (chromosome) evolution and reverse engineering for feature selection,
the goal is to develop rules which correctly classify all the connections as per their
classes. The detection rate in an IDS is synonymous to the classification rate in
a data mining algorithm. For an IDS the following definitions are often used to
describe the system efficiency:
1. True positive (TP):
Correctly classifying an intrusion as an intrusion. The true positive rate is
synonymous with detection rate, sensitivity, and recall, which are other terms
often used in the literature.
2. False positive (FP):
Incorrectly classifying a normal data connection as an intrusion. Also known
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as a false alarm.
3. True negative (TN):
Correctly classifying normal data connection as normal. The true negative
rate is also referred to as specificity.
4. False negative (FN):
Incorrectly classifying an intrusive or malicious connection as normal.
For a reliable intrusion detection system which correctly classifies all the connec-
tion the number of true positives and true negative should be high and the number
of false positives and false negatives should zero (ideal case) or very small.
Using the above parameters the accuracy and precision of IDS is defined as
Accuracy =
TP + TN
TP + TN + FP + FN
=
No. of correct classifications
Total no. of classifications
(2.2)
Precision =
TP
TP + FP
=
No. of correct intrusive classifications
Total number of correctclassifications
(2.3)
The goal of this thesis work is to build an intrusion detection system with high
accuracy and precision along with the betterments in speed accuracy and adaptabil-
ity as compared to other systems.
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2.4 Research Approach
In order to achieve the objective of this thesis work, the following steps will be taken:
• Review the existing literature on the use of intelligent techniques based on
iterative heuristics for network intrusion detection.
• Propose a genetic algorithm and a data mining based technique for model
(rule) construction to accurately emulate intrusion data.
• Implement the technique using software based tools and perform simulations.
• Perform simulations with distorted and incomplete network intrusion data.
• Idealize the outcomes of the simulations through the selection of the most
appropriate statistical techniques for attack parameter selection.
• Compare the results of the proposed technique in terms of the defined perfor-
mance metrics.
Chapter 3
Literature Review
The anomaly detection techniques can be classified into the follwing main categories
1. Statistical-based techniques.
2. Knowledge based techniques.
3. Machine learning based techniques.
4. Evolutionary Algorithms
3.1 Statistical Based techniques
Statistical based techniques model profiles which represent the stochastic behavior
of the network traffic activity. Traffic rate, number of packets for each protocol,
connection rate, number of different IP addresses are among the parameters used
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for profile modelling. These techniques use two sets of data. One set is the cur-
rently observed profile over time whereas the other is the previously trained profile.
The current profile is compared with the previous one to determine a anomaly score
which indicates the degree of irregularity for a specific event and is used to deter-
mine the occurrence of anomaly when this score exceeds a certain threshold [6].
Denning et al. [7] proposed univariate model and used the parameters as indepen-
dent Gaussian random variables and defined an acceptable range of values for each
parameter. Ye et al. [7] suggested use of multivariate models based on correlations
between two or more metrics. Experiments showed better results with correlated
data instead of individually selected values.
Statistical based techniques have several advantages over other techniques. Firstly
they do not need to be trained with normal or malicious behavior of the network
because they have the ability to learn normal traffic behavior from observations.
Secondly, such systems prove to be useful in providing accurate information about
malicious traffic over longer periods. Apart from the advantages, these systems are
also exposed to the risk of being trained by the intruder to bypass the malicious
traffic. Also defining thresholds is a difficult task and not all the network behaviors
can be modelled with stochastic methods. The assumption made in these systems
should be realistic.
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3.2 Knowledge Based Techniques
Knowledge based schemes classify the presented data according a set of rules. Their
operation involve three major steps. First a number of different attributes are identi-
fied and selected from the training data, second numerous classification rules/parameters
are deduced and finally the presented data is classified according to the set of
rules generated. Expert systems are an example of knowledge based systems. The
model(rules) used is either human designed or is generated using some tool i.e. FSM
or description languages. Este´vez-Tapiador et al. [8] presented one such technique.
The advantage of knowledge based systems in intrusion detection is their robustness
and flexibility. But the major drawback of such systems is their inability to gen-
erate perfect rules and models. This is because the task is very difficult and time
consuming even for a human expert.
3.3 Machine Learning based Techniques
Machine learning based techniques aim to develop an explicit or implicit model that
enables the patterns to be classified accordingly. Machine learning techniques require
labelled data in order for the system to be trained to detect and classify connections
accordingly. Some of the machine learning techniques are similar to statistical tech-
niques in the way they improve their developed models by training with new data.
The major drawback of such techniques is their heavy resource requirements. Many
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machine learning techniques have been used to develop intrusion detection systems.
Some of the techniques include Bayesian networks, artificial neural networks, fuzzy
systems, Markov models and clustering for outlier detection.
3.4 Evolutionary algorithms based techniques
Several iterative algorithms such as genetic algorithms, particle swarm optimization,
simulated annealing, taboo search, etc have been applied to the problem of intrusion
detection. But genetic algorithm has been widely used mainly for intrusion detection
in different flavors. In some cases a pure genetic algorithm has been applied whereas
in other cases it is used in combination with other heuristics or techniques.
Genetic Algorithm or Genetic Programming based systems are superior as compared
to others due to their ability to be easily retrained. It is sufficient to employ the
best population evolved in the previous iteration as initial population and repeat
the process, but this time including new data. This makes the system inherently
adaptive [9].
However, the outcome produced by GA is known to be accompanied by a large
amount of false positives. As such, most of the research in the area is centered on
the concept of trying to minimize these false positives.
Chittur [10] proposed a genetic algorithm based technique which learns how to
detect and separate malicious network connections from normal ones. This method
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was supposed to eliminate the inherent problems of fingerprinting systems [10, 11].
The mathematical model decision tree held a randomized coefficient for the data, so
that when it is multiplied by the data it yielded a certainty factor of weight which
determined whether that record was an attack or not, the coefficients used were
based on ERC (Ephemeral Redundancy Constants) [12]. The mutation operation
was a result of slight change in these values. As the dataset is comprised of both
symbolic and continuous values so different weights using ERC were selected for
continuous values and for symbolic values the constants were randomly established.
The fitness function used was based on how many attacks were correctly detected
and how many legal connections were classified as attacks. The fitness function used
is given in equation 3.1
Fitness =
α
A
− β
B
(3.1)
where α is the number of attacks correctly detected, A is the total number of at-
tacks, β is the number of normal connections classified as attacks (false negative)
and B is the total number of normal connections. The generated mathematical
model was then evolved using the genetic operators crossover and mutation based
on the fitness.. The proposed technique was 97% accurate with a false positive rate
of 0.6877%.
Li et al.[13] presented an initial framework for intrusion detection using genetic
algorithms. The proposed technique models simple rules for network traffic that
21
differentiate normal connections from anomalous connections. Rules were stored in
the form of “if condition then act”. The condition refers to a match between the
current network connection and the rules in the IDS, such as source and destination
IP addresses and port numbers (used in TCP/IP network protocols), duration of
the connection, protocol used, etc., and the act field defines the action based on the
security policy such as such as reporting an alert to the system administrator or
stopping the connection,.
In this scheme a hexadecimal encoding scheme was proposed for the IP addresses in
the chromosome. The fitness of a chromosome depends on its ability to differentiate
between normal and anomalous connections correctly. The actual validity of a rule
is examined by matching the historical data set comprised of connections marked as
either anomalous or normal. On successful match between a rule and an anomalous
behavior, a bonus is given to the current chromosome and a penalty is applied if the
chromosome matches with any of the normal connection.
The outcome of a connection is calculated based on whether a field of the connection
matches the pre-classified data set, and it is then multiplied by the weight of that
field. The weight values are identified according to different fields in the connection
record as reported by network sniffers. Therefore, all genes representing the destina-
tion IP address field have the same weight. For example, in most attacks destination
IP address is the target of an intrusion while the source IP address is the originator
of the Intrusion, hence the destination IP address is awarded the highest weight fol-
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lowed by source IP address. Other parameters that are used include the destination
port number, source port number, duration of connection, etc. The Matched value
is a Boolean value and the calculation of outcome is depicted in equation 3.2
Outcome =
∑
Matched ∗Weighti (3.2)
The absolute difference between the outcome of the chromosome and the actual
suspicious level is computed as a ∆ factor. The suspiciouslevel is a threshold that
indicates the degree to which two network connections are considered as a “match”.
∆ = |Outcome− suspiciouslevel| (3.3)
On the occurrence of a mismatch, a penalty is computed using the ∆ factor.
The ranking in the equation is a measure of whether or not an intrusion is easy to
identify.
penalty =
∆ ∗ ranking
100
(3.4)
fitness = 1− penalty (3.5)
Li et al.[13] suggested the use of a large number of rules as there are so many
network connections possible. As there is a possibility that a small set of rules will
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not detect the entire range of anomalies.
Bankovic et al. [9, 14] proposed a serial combination of two genetic algorithm based
intrusion detection systems that provides the advantage of being simple due to its
low computational overhead. The first IDS is used as a simple linear classifier for
anomaly detection that differentiates normal connections from possible attacks. Be-
cause this system is known to exhibit a high rate of false-positives, the authors
implemented an additional system based on if-then rules that is trained to recognize
normal connections. This filters the output of the first system to considerably re-
duce the number of false positives. The linear classifier is trained using incremental
Genetic Algorithm (GA) where each chromosome in the population comprises of
four genes. The first three chromosomes characterize the coefficients of the linear
classifier and the fourth one signifies the threshold value. The rules system is also
similarly trained using incremental GA, where each rule is represented by a 3-gene
chromosome. However, the population chosen in this case is significantly lower as
compared to the first stage of the system. The division of the entire setup into
two different systems allows each of the systems to be trained independently of the
other.
Folorunso et al. [15] proposed an intrusion detection system called Intrusion Detec-
tion - Self Organizing Migrating Genetic Algorithm (ID-SOMGA) which is based
on the combination of two algorithms: optimization algorithm - Self Organizing
Migrating Algorithm (SOMA) and the Genetic Algorithm (GA). The motivation
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behind this integration of SOMA and GA was its ability to handle both low and
high population sizes and its advanced exploration capabilities. ID-SOMGA is a
rule based system with the goal to develop rules that detect only the anomalous
connections. These rules are tested on historical connections and are used to filter
new connections to find suspicious network traffic. On successful detection of an
anomalous connection, the rule is assigned a bonus point and otherwise a penalty
is given. Although, ID-SOMGA exhibits a slower detection rate than an IDS with
GA, it has a very low false positive rate.
Gong et al. [16] proposed a genetic algorithm based ID approach which is composed
of two modules where each works in a different stage: the training stage and the ID
stage. The training stage uses GA in an oﬄine environment to generate rules from
historical data. In the ID stage, the incoming traffic connections are classified in the
real-time environment using the rules generated in the training stage. The authors
chose two subsets from the 1998 DARPA dataset. Each record of the database con-
sists of 9 network features and one added manually. A record is identified either as
a normal connection or as a network intrusion based on the record type.
The fitness function in Genetic Algorithm is used as a metric to select the fit in-
dividuals who would undergo crossover and mutation to create the next generation
population. Islam et al. [17] recommended a fitness function that is based on the
accuracy-existence-occurrence structure.
The accuracy factor (af) represents the accuracy of rules. If a rule is represented
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as, if A then C and the size of the training dataset is N, then: af = |A and C|/|A|;
existence = |A|/N ; occurrence = |A and C|/N . |A| stands for the number of
records that only satisfy condition A. |C| stands for the number of records that only
satisfy consequent C. |A and C| stands for the number of records that satisfy both
conditions A and consequent C.
A higher accuracy factor points to a strong rule to detect anomaly whereas a higher
value of existence indicates that the rule matches more in the dataset. The value
of existence is only needed for the random selection function of GA while both ac-
curacy factor and the occurrence are to be included in the fitness function. The
authors propose the use of accuracy factor and occurrence in a weighted form. A
highly secured network demands a higher weight for accuracy and a faster security
implementation implies a higher weight for occurrence.
Chapter 4
Attacks Description
There are four classes of attacks found in NSL-KDD dataset which is the enhanced
version of the KDD99 intrusion detection dataset. A complete description of the
dataset and the attacks is provided in [18, 19]. Each of the classes and the corre-
sponding attacks are described below.
4.1 Denial of Service
The dictionary meaning for denial of service is to repudiate what is intended for
you. In the context of computer and network security, a denial of service attack
repudiates legitimate users of the requested service. The requested service may be
a web access, a file download, etc. In this type of attack, the attacker makes the
requested server too busy by either making establishing parallel connections to the
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server or slowing it down. In both the cases a legitimate server is denied of the
requested service or it takes too long for the user to access the service.
The most common type of denial of service attack is when the attack floods the
servers with too much information to handle. For example instead of requesting a
web address from the web browser the attacker types a large number of backslashes
(back attack) which is mostly used as escape sequence. When the web server receives
this information it takes more time in processing this request and hence the other
users find the server unavailable.
A number of different denial of service attacks are found in the NSL-KDD dataset.
In the following subsections some of these attacks are described in detail.
4.1.1 Apache2
The “Apche2” is a kind of denial of service attack that targets Apache web servers.
In this attack, a user request consists of a large number of http headers. In order
to process these headers the server takes more time, slows down and even crashes
in many situations. The number of headers used in the attack can be varied by
attacker.
For an intrusion detection system to detect Apache2 successfully should look for an
anomalous number of headers in a request. Typically a web page consists of about
10 to 30 object ion a page so a network connection request with hundred or more
headers can be considered as malicious.
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4.1.2 Back
The “Back” attack is a kind of denial of service attack that targets Apache web
servers. In this attack, a large number of front-slashes (’/’) are submitted to the
web server as a request. This large number of front slashes slows down the server
and makes it unavailable for other requests. This attack consumes a large number of
CPU cycles of the server and slows down all the other system or user related activ-
ities. When this attack is stopped by the attacker the system/server automatically
recovers.
An intrusion detection system looking to detect back attack should account for the
number of front slashes in the request. If the number is higher than a threshold
then the connection should be considered as an attack.
4.1.3 Land
The “Land” attack is a kind of denial of service attack which targets relatively old
TCP/IP machines. In this attack, a spoofed or a crafted SYN packet with the
same source and destination IP address is sent to the machine/server. Under this
attack, the CPU of the target machine is heavily utilized by processing the spoofed
connection which slows the system down and ultimately results in denial of service.
Any intrusion detection system can detect a Land attack easily by examining the
source and destination IP addresses in the packet. In the KDD dataset, this is
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indicated by the land field which is set when both the source and destination IP
addresses are the same in a connection or a packet [20, 21].
4.1.4 Mailbomb
The “Mailbomb” attack is a kind of denial of service attack in which an attacker
overflows the target machine/server queue by sending a large number of messages.
These messages add up in the server’s queue and result in a possible system failure.
For an intrusion detection system to successfully detect a mailbomb attack, it should
monitor the number of messages being sent from or sent to a certain user in a short
period of time. This calls for determining the thresholds being imposed by the mail
exchange servers and will be different for different networks.
4.1.5 Neptune
The “Neptune” attack is a kind of denial of service attack which can affect most of
the TCP/IP based systems. Neptune attack is also known as SYN Flood attack.
All half open tcp connections are recorded in the ”tcpd” server. This data structure
contains information on all the pending connections. In this attack this data struc-
ture is overwhelmed by creating a lot of such connections until the target system is
not able to accept new incoming connections. The table is cleared after the timeout
interval. But for crafted IP packets which request new connections quicker than the
target system can timeout, the table will never clear its content and runs out of
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memory, reject newer incoming connections and eventually crash [22].
For an intrusion detection system to detect a Neptune attack successfully, it should
check the simultaneous number of SYN packets destined for a certain machine (com-
puter). The source of the connection might not be known. If the number of simulta-
neous packets is higher than a defined threshold then it can be termed as a Neptune
attack.
4.1.6 Ping of Death (POD)
The “Ping of Death” (pod) is a kind of denial of service attack in which the attacker
sends oversized IP packets. Different systems behave differently under this attack
[23]. Some of the known effects include system rebooting, abrupt halting and instant
rebooting. This is the simplest of the attacks to create, e.g. any one can create
oversized ping packets by using the command ping − l < packetsize >.
Any intrusion detection system looking to detect ping of death attack has to monitor
the size of ICMP packets. For example any ICMP packet larger than 64000 bytes
is considered as ping of death attack.
4.1.7 Smurf
The “smurf” attack is a kind of denial of service attack in which the attacker uses
ICMP echo requests with a spoofed source address. The replies of these ICMP echo
requests cause the target machine to crash. This attack involves three entities, the
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first is the attacker, the second is the intermediate machine which receives the echo
request from the attacker and sends a reply. And the third one is the victim machine
which receives the replies. The intermediate machine can also be the target machine
[24].
For intrusion detection system to detect this attack successfully it should monitor if
there is a large number of “echo replies” being sent to a particular machine. These
replies may originate from a different machine as well. Another striking feature of
this attack is that no echo request is being sent from the victim machine.
4.1.8 Teardrop
The “teardrop” attack is a kind of denial of service attack that targets those TCP/IP
implementations which are not able to deal with overlapping IP fragments properly.
A teardrop attack causes the target system to reboot. This problem was usually
found in older TCP/IP based machines [25].
An intrusion detection system aiming to detect this attack should analyze two IP
packets. One with the fragment offset of 0 having a payload of N with the MF
flag set, and the second with the MF flag cleared and offset of greater than N and
a payload size of less than N.
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4.1.9 Udpstorm
A “Udpstorm” attack is a kind of denial of service attack which aims to reduce the
system efficiency by slowing the target machine down or congesting the network. In
this attack, the attacker sends a spoofed packet (from the echo port) to the victim
machines. The victim machines respond to the echo request by assuming that the
other machine requested it. This process continues in a loop until a super user or
network administrator stops it. This endless loop creates a denial of service [26].
The are two methods to detect “udpstorm” attack efficiently. The first method
to detect if the packet has originated outside the local network. The second is by
monitoring, if a large number of packets are being sent between the echo port of the
victim machines.
4.2 User to Root (U2R)
This is a class of network attack in which the intruder begins with a normal user
account (privileges) of the target system and is somehow able to acquire super-user
access and privileges. This can be done by launching a brute force or a dictionary
based attack to acquire the super-user privileges. Sniffing the password over unsafe
connection is also one of the methods to access the administrator (super-user) access.
A buffer overflow attack is the most common attack of this class where an insufficient
buffer space leads to the execution of arbitrary commands on the target machine.
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One of the ways to avoid U2R attacks is careful programming but it has been seen
that some utilities are susceptible to these kinds of attacks. In the following text
different number of U2R attacks are explained.
4.2.1 Loadmodule
The “Loadmodule” attack is a kind of a U2R attack which exploits a bug in the
loadmodule program in its ability to clear the current buffer and stack. By exploiting
this vulnerability a user can acquire super-user privileges on the local machine.[27]
A network based intrusion detection system can detect a loadmodule attack by
observing the packet exchange between the attacker and the target machine. If the
strings in the packet involve setting of configurable parameters of the system, the
connection can be termed as anomalous.
4.2.2 Perl
The “Perl” attack is a kind of user to root attack which aims at exploiting flaws
in perl implementations. Suidperl is a version of Perl that supports saved set-user-
ID and set-group-ID scripts. In early versions of suidperl the interpreter does not
properly relinquish its root privileges when changing its effective user and group
IDs. On a system that has the suidperl, or sperl, program installed and supports
saved set-user-ID and saved set-group-ID, anyone with access to an account on the
system can gain root access.
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4.3 Probe
This is a class of computer attacks in which an attacker scans the network connec-
tions and activities to find vulnerabilities and the network and the computers which
are part of it [28]. Such type of activities are useful to intruders to launch attacks
in future, if the vulnerabilities are not resolved. Satan, mscan, saint are among the
most common probing tools and their ease of use does not require an attacker to be
an expert, and can gain information of known vulnerabilities on target machines.
The problem with this class of attacks is their time duration because an attacker
can scan a machine frequently or slowly. Frequent scanning can be detected easily
as once an attacker comes under the radar and if he is scanning machines in short
time duration again and again it is easier for an intrusion detection system to detect
it. But if an attacker is scanning one port a day, then it is quite difficult for any
system to detect such kind of attacker. In the following text, some of the probing
attacks in the NSL-KDD dataset are explained.
4.3.1 Ipsweep
The “Ipsweep” is a kind of probe attack in which an attacker sweeps the network to
determine the active machines on the network. The attacker looks for the machines
listening on the network. This information can then be used by attackers to launch
attacks and exploit vulnerabilities. For an intrusion detection system to detect
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ipsweep attack, it should monitor those ping requests which are destined to a number
of computers on the network originating from the same source. The best way to
determine an active machine on the network is through a ping test.
4.3.2 Mscan
Mscan is a kind of probing attack which utilizes domain name server zone transfers
and exhaustive brute force attacks for scanning IP addresses to find machines with
known vulnerabilities [29, 30].
A specific signature for mscan attack is hard to discover because it is dependent of the
type of services or ports and the number of machines being scanned. Generally, an
intrusion detection system can detect this attack by identifying connections from a
single outside source to several ports on a single target system or to several machines
in a short time period.
4.3.3 Nmap
Nmap is a widely available network scanning utility which is used to scan ports. The
three most common scanning feature of this tool are UDP scanning, FIN scanning
and SYN scanning of target machines. Nmap can be detected by an intrusion
detection system by identifying a port-scan. A port scan can be related to TCP,
UDP, FIN or SYN packets. A port-scan can be identified from connections from an
external source to several ports on a single target system or to several machines in
36
a short time period [31].
4.3.4 Saint
Saint is an acronym for Security Administrator Integrated Network Tool which is
used to probe information on information services and potential security flaws on
network services such as finger, ftp, etc. Most of these flaws are operating system
bugs, bugs in network utilities, incorrectly configured network services and bad
policy decisions [32].
For an intrusion detection system to detect these attacks successfully, it should
identify the distinct set network traffic which is created by scans. It has been found
that in saint, almost all the scans performed are similar. So it is quite easy to detect
this probe.
4.3.5 Satan
Satan is a probing attack quite similar to saint in the way it operates. The detec-
tion pattern for satan is the same for all scans performed. The following are the
vulnerabilities scanned by Satan [33]:
1. NFS export to un-privileged programs.
2. NFS export via portmapper.
3. NIS passwords file access.
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4. REXD access.
5. tftp file access.
6. Remote shell access.
7. Unrestricted NFS export.
8. Unrestricted X Server access.
9. write-able ftp home directory.
10. Several Sendmail vulnerabilities.
11. Several ftp vulnerabilities.
4.4 Remote to Local (R2L)
Remote to Local (R2L) attacks are caused by unauthorized access from a remote
machine. In these attacks, the aim of the attacker is to gain unauthorized access to
the local account of the server. Most of these attacks attempt to exploit vulnerabili-
ties and bugs in system utilities. Different versions of these attacks are found in the
data set. These attacks are mostly platform specific. Warezmaster and warezclient
attacks are the most common examples of this attack category. In warezmaster
attack the the attacker uses an anonymous account to create a directory of illegal
software of the server. Once the directory is created, users of the ftp server can
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access the directory to download illegal software which is the warezclient attack.
Two of the R2L attacks are described below
4.4.1 ftp write
The “ftp write” attack is a kind of R2L attack which exploits flaws in ftp server
configurations. If the anonymous ftp capabilities or directories are not configured
as per the network policies, e.g. if root ftp directories are part of the same group in
which ftp accounts are and if these directories are writable. Then it is possible for
an attacker to add, modify, delete files and make an even acquire access to the local
system [34].
In order to keep the network safe from ftp write attacks, the ftp server configuration
should be correct. But for an intrusion detection system to detect this attack suc-
cessfully, it should continuously monitor all the activities on the ftp servers. If any
kind of file is created or modified in the root directory from an anonymous source
it should be detected as ftp write attack.
4.4.2 Phf
The “phf” attack is an R2L attack which exploits a poorly written CGI script and
the attacker is able to complete his actions on the http server with the super-user
privilege level. This attack was targeted at acquiring the httpd server’s /etc/passwd
file which contains all the passwords of the users in the system. In this attack the
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attack does not have any account on the target machine.[35]
For an intrusion detection system to successfully detect this attack it should contin-
uously monitor the http requests. If a request contains phf invocations and attempt
to run some commands then it should detect as a “phf” attack [36].
Chapter 5
Network Intrusion Detection
System Architecture
The proposed network intrusion detection system is composed of the following five
modules.
1. Data Preprocessing Module.
2. Attack Modelling Module.
3. Anomalous Classification Module.
4. Fitness Evaluator
5. Evolutionary Module.
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In the following text all the sections are described in detail of their working and
implementation.
5.1 Data Preprocessing Module
This is the first block of the intrusion detection system. The main purpose of this
block is to create attack masks. An attack mask is a binary string which indicates
the features selected for detection of a particular attack. Attack mask comprises of
42 comma separated elements ordered with the KDD data set. A “1”in the attack
mask string indicates that the feature is relevant and has been selected by the fea-
ture selection algorithm where as a “0”indicates that the field is don’t care and is
not relevant in the detection of that attack. The relevance of a field is determined by
the feature selection algorithm automatically or is manually described in the attack
chromosome modelling. The attack mask is used to create the attack chromosomes
from the training set which serve as comparison strings for detection of attack from
the test set.
Attack masks are created using the data mining software WEKA 3.6 [37] for fea-
ture ranking and subset evaluating simulations and are generated manually for the
reverse engineering simulation.
For example, let us consider the following attack mask string for land attack gener-
ated using the chi-square feature ranking method:
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0,1,1,1,1,1,1,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,1,1,1,1,1,0,0, 0,0,1,1,1,0,0,1,1,1,1,0,0,1
The string indicates that features 7(land), 38(dst host serror rate), 39(dst host srv serror rate),
26 (srv serror rate), 4 (flag), 25 (serror rate), 3 (service), 37 (dst host srv diff host rate),
32 (dst host count), 5 (src bytes), 36(dst host same src port rate), 33 (dst host srv count),
31(srv diff host rate), 6(dst bytes), 24(srv count), 12(logged in), 23(count), 2(pro-
tocol type), 22(is guest login) and 21(is host login) are considered relevant in the
detection by the chi-square algorithm. The rest of the features are don’t care fields
and will not be used in building the attack chromosomes.
It should be noted that the last feature is 1 and will remain 1 for all the attack
masks and it indicates that the type of the connection will be taken as it is.
5.2 Attack Modelling Module
The “Attack Modelling Module”takes attack masks as input and outputs the attack
chromosomes. Attack chromosomes comprise of 42 comma separated elements or-
dered with the KDD data-set with the last element indicating the attack type (class
of data row). A “1”in the attack mask is replaced by the value of the corresponding
field of the malicious connection and a “0”is replaced by an X which indicates that
the field is a ‘don’t care’field.
Two classes of chromosomes can be created using the attack chromosome creation
block
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1. Pattern based Chromosome
2. Threshold based chromosome
5.2.1 Pattern based Chromosome
Pattern matching chromosomes detect attacks which exactly match with them. In
other words these chromosomes are the exact signature of the attacks created from
the training set and the connections which exactly match with the features and their
values in the chromosomes are classified as attacks of the indicated type.
The complete training set is analyzed based on the attack mask provided and the
sample size. Sample size is a predefined simulation parameter and accounts for the
number of instances that will be analyzed in one run of the chromosome development
step. For the pattern matching chromosomes all the connection with the distinct
values are selected and added to the attack chromosome database. Table 5.1 is an
example of pattern based chromosomes with the sample size of 10. As the pattern
based chromosomes are based on exact matches so all the connections with distinct
values as indicated by the attack mask will be selected for chromosomes. It can
be seen that out of the ten sample connections selected, only one chromosome is
constructed out of a number of similar connections and even a single different field
causes a new chromosome to be added to the set of chromosomes generated.
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5.2.2 Threshold based Chromosome
Threshold based chromosomes detect attacks which exceed the threshold defined
in chromosome. For these chromosomes to detect attacks successfully the fields of
protocol, service and flag should match exactly as they are part of the connection
describing fields and are symbolic values so threshold value for them cannot be
defined. The rest of the features including source and destination bytes are either
continuous or binary values for which threshold can be defined. Based on the sample
size provided, exact values for fields of protocol, service and flag are selected whereas
for the rest of the fields the lower threshold is selected. All the connection is the
test set which match exactly to the first four fields and exceed the threshold for the
rest are classified as attacks of the indicated types.
Table 5.2is an example of threshold based chromosomes with the sample size of 10.
The threshold for a particular field is created based on the floor of the values for
that field. As the first four fields will be pattern based even in the threshold based
values for the rest of the values lowest values if selected for the chromosome. The
number of chromosomes using this technique is smaller than that in the pattern
matching chromosomes.
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Attack Mask
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
1 1 1 1 1 1
Sample Connections Set
0 tcp http SF 54540 8314 0 0 0 2 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 3 0 0 0 0
1 0 0 109 109 1 0 0.01 0 0 0 0.01 0.01 back
0 tcp http RSTR 33336 2920 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 5 5 0 0
0.4 0.4 1 0 0 255 255 1 0 0 0 0 0 0.06 0.06 back
0 tcp http SF 54540 8314 0 0 0 2 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 6 7 0 0 0
0.14 1 0 0.29 255 255 1 0 0 0 0 0 0.05 0.05 back
0 tcp http RSTR 54060 2920 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 4 4 0 0
0.25 0.25 1 0 0 255 255 1 0 0 0 0 0 0.05 0.05 back
0 tcp http SF 54540 8314 0 0 0 2 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 2 0 0 0 0
1 0 0 39 39 1 0 0.03 0 0 0 0 0 back
0 tcp http SF 54540 8314 0 0 0 2 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 2 0 0 0 0
1 0 0 57 57 1 0 0.02 0 0 0 0.02 0.02 back
0 tcp http S2 54540 8315 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 6 6 0.17
0.17 0 0 1 0 0 255 255 1 0 0 0 0.01 0.01 0.04 0.04 back
0 tcp http RSTR 54540 7300 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 2 0 0
0.5 0.5 1 0 0 255 255 1 0 0 0 0 0 0.05 0.05 back
0 tcp http SF 54540 8314 0 0 0 2 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 6 6 0 0 0.17
0.17 1 0 0 12 12 1 0 0.08 0 0 0 0.08 0.08 back
0 tcp http SF 54540 8314 0 0 0 2 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 3 0 0 0.33
0.33 1 0 0 96 96 1 0 0.01 0 0 0 0.16 0.16 back
Pattern based Chromosomes
0 tcp http SF 54540 8314 0 X X 2 X 1 1 X X X X X 0 X 0 0 3 3 0
X 0 0 1 0 0 109 109 1 0 0.01 0 0 0 0.01 0.01 back
0 tcp http RSTR 33336 2920 0 X X 1 X 1 0 X X X X X 0 X 0 0 5
5 0 X 0.4 0.4 1 0 0 255 255 1 0 0 0 0 0 0.06 0.06 back
0 tcp http S2 54540 8315 0 X X 1 X 1 0 X X X X X 0 X 0 0 6 6
0.17 X 0 0 1 0 0 255 255 1 0 0 0 0.01 0.01 0.04 0.04 back
0 tcp http RSTR 54540 7300 0 X X 1 X 1 0 X X X X X 0 X 0 0 2
2 0 X 0.5 0.5 1 0 0 255 255 1 0 0 0 0 0 0.05 0.05 back
Table 5.1: Pattern Based Chromosome example
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Attack Mask
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
1 1 1 1 1 1
Sample Connections Set
0 tcp http SF 54540 8314 0 0 0 2 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 3 0 0 0 0
1 0 0 109 109 1 0 0.01 0 0 0 0.01 0.01 back
0 tcp http RSTR 33336 2920 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 5 5 0 0
0.4 0.4 1 0 0 255 255 1 0 0 0 0 0 0.06 0.06 back
0 tcp http SF 54540 8314 0 0 0 2 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 6 7 0 0 0
0.14 1 0 0.29 255 255 1 0 0 0 0 0 0.05 0.05 back
0 tcp http RSTR 54060 2920 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 4 4 0 0
0.25 0.25 1 0 0 255 255 1 0 0 0 0 0 0.05 0.05 back
0 tcp http SF 54540 8314 0 0 0 2 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 2 0 0 0 0
1 0 0 39 39 1 0 0.03 0 0 0 0 0 back
0 tcp http SF 54540 8314 0 0 0 2 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 2 0 0 0 0
1 0 0 57 57 1 0 0.02 0 0 0 0.02 0.02 back
0 tcp http S2 54540 8315 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 6 6 0.17
0.17 0 0 1 0 0 255 255 1 0 0 0 0.01 0.01 0.04 0.04 back
0 tcp http RSTR 54540 7300 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 2 0 0
0.5 0.5 1 0 0 255 255 1 0 0 0 0 0 0.05 0.05 back
0 tcp http SF 54540 8314 0 0 0 2 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 6 6 0 0 0.17
0.17 1 0 0 12 12 1 0 0.08 0 0 0 0.08 0.08 back
0 tcp http SF 54540 8314 0 0 0 2 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 3 0 0 0.33
0.33 1 0 0 96 96 1 0 0.01 0 0 0 0.16 0.16 back
Threshold based Chromosomes
0 tcp http RSTR 33336 2920 0 X X 1 X 1 0 X X X X X 0 X 0 0 5
5 0 X 0.4 0.4 1 0 0 255 255 1 0 0 0 0 0 0.06 0.06 back
0 tcp http RSTR 54540 7300 0 X X 1 X 1 0 X X X X X 0 X 0 0 2
2 0 X 0.5 0.5 1 0 0 255 255 1 0 0 0 0 0 0.05 0.05 back
Table 5.2: Threshold Based Chromosome example
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5.3 Anomaly Classification Module
This is the block implemented as the search engine in the intrusion detection sys-
tem. Attack Chromosomes are provided as input to this block and then the whole
test set is searched based on the attack chromosomes provided. The objective of
the search process is to identify malicious connections in the test set based on the
attack chromosomes provided.
The searching procedure is based on the type of chromosomes provided as input.
If pattern based chromosomes are provided then the search algorithm looks for the
exact matches in the values of attack chromosome and if threshold based chromo-
somes are provided then the search algorithm looks for malicious connections that
exceed the threshold values defined by the chromosomes. The don’t care fields (X)
in the attack chromosomes are not compared with the corresponding values in the
test set.
The significance of the pattern based chromosome is that they are based on exact
signature of attacks whereas threshold based chromosomes rely on nominal values
for normal connections or the minimum values that an attack connection might have
and the connections with values greater than those specified in the chromosome are
tagged malicious.
The output of this block is the count of number of connections correctly detected as
the attacks by the chromosome and the number of normal connections being classi-
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fied as attacks. As the technique is a misuse detection system so all the connections
that pass through the system are considered as normal connections.
5.4 Fitness Evaluation Module
Fitness of the attack chromosomes is evaluated in this module. Fitness is a term
associated with genetic algorithm which defines how good a given chromosome is.
In intrusion detection fitness is actually a measure of calculating the accuracy of
detection for a chromosome. It accounts for the number of connections correctly
classified as attacks and the number of normal connections incorrectly classified
as attacks. In other words fitness is a measure of goodness minus badness of a
chromosome. Mathematically
α
A
− β
B
(5.1)
In the above equation, α (alpha) is the number of connections correctly classified as
attacks β (beta) is the number of normal connections classified incorrectly as attack
A is the number of attacks of that type and B is the number of normal connections.
The efficiency of this fitness function is that the fitness value always remains between
+1 and -1 with +1 being the best chromosome which has detected all the attacks of
that type and -1 being the worst chromosome which has not detected any attack but
has detected all the normal connections as attacks. Typically, a chromosome with
a positive fitness value is considered to be good because the percentage of detected
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attacks is greater than the percentage of false alarms.
5.5 Evolutionary Module
Genetic operations like crossover and mutation are performed in the evolutionary
module. Both genetic operators’ crossover and mutations are used to evolve the
chromosomes from the initial population to the subsequent generations. Before the
genetic operations are performed all the chromosomes are sorted based on their fit-
ness.
The chromosomes are selected based on roulette wheel selection for crossover. Chro-
mosomes with high fitness values are more likely to go into crossover for generating
offsprings in subsequent generations. In the roulette wheel method chromosomes
with smaller fitness values also have a chance to participate for the next generation
but their probability of being selected in smaller as compared to those with high
fitness values. Another method is random selection of parent chromosomes for the
crossover where the chromosomes are selected randomly and every chromosome has
an equal chance of participating in the next generation. The new offspring generated
through crossover has the properties of their parents. The percentage of properties
being transferred from parents depends on the cut-point. A simple cut-catenate
crossover is being implemented for the intrusion detection system. The idea for this
crossover is to generate new chromosomes which are valid and detect different at-
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tacks which inhibit properties from other attacks. For example parent1 and parent 2
crossover to generate offspring1 and offspring2. The process is depicted in figure 5.1.
Figure 5.1: Crossover example
The second operator is mutation. The mutation operator introduces random
changes in the chromosome which is useful to explore new possibilities of attacks in
the test set. Mutation is implemented with the simple concept of bit flipping. For
mutation a chromosome is selected at random and one of the 41 features within the
chromosome is also randomly selected. Once the feature is selected it is replaced
by another value of the same feature. Every feature is binary represented in the
mutation block once the feature is selected its binary value is computed and one of
the bits is inverted which is converted back to the string and replaced in the original
chromosome.
For the values which are neither binary nor symbolic random changes are introduced.
For example source and destination bytes are continuous values and are mutated by
either incrementing or decrementing the original value.
51
5.6 System Flow
The modular description of the system is shown in figure 5.2 and the flow of data
between them is illustrated in figure 5.3
Figure 5.2: System Architecture
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Figure 5.3: System Flow
Chapter 6
Intrusion detection with Feature
Selection Techniques
6.1 Feature Selection
Feature selection is the process of determining features of the data set which are
relevant for problem solving. In case of network intrusion detection (a problem of
classifying dataset rows as per their type) feature selection refers to the problem
of selecting those features which are relevant in the detection of that attack. The
objective of feature selection is to determine a subset of features which is able to de-
scribe data as good as or better (if possible) than the original data set [38]. Feature
Selection is important in those problems where it is either computationally infeasi-
ble to use all the features or where the estimation can be applied with limited data
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samples. [39]
The advantage of feature selection is that it can be used to improve the performance
of classification algorithms by using important and useful features only. Another ad-
vantage is that it enables the algorithm to scale up to the size of full feature set
both in terms of space and time. It also helps is removing redundant and useless
features.
Each connection is the KDD dataset is defined by 41 features. These 41 features
include basic features which are obtained directly from packet header, content fea-
tures acquired by applying domain knowledge on the data portion, time based traffic
features which represent connection properties over a two second time interval and
host based traffic features which contain traffic records based on the number of con-
nections to the same host [40].
As each connection is described by 41 features it is quite difficult to develop a rule
which successfully detects that attack [41]. It is also not feasible to manually test
all the possible combinations of features that maximize the detection rate for that
attack because it will call for the testing of 41! combinations (3.34525266 × 1049),
to determine the best combination.
In order to achieve the best results several feature selection algorithms are employed
to determine the best subset of features for detection of an attack. In this project
I have employed four statistical methods including the attribute evaluator and sub-
set evaluator based techniques to acquire the best set of features to maximize the
55
detection rate and reduce the false alarm rate.
6.2 Attribute Evaluation Methods
One of the methods for feature selection is the attribute evaluation method. The
attribute evaluation method is some times called “Filter based methods ”. These
methods calculate the relevance of a feature with respect to the class and are inde-
pendent of any classifiers [39]. The aim is to create a feature subset based on the
most prominent features [42].
6.2.1 Chi-square
Chi-square is a statistical quantitative measure used to determine the relationship
between two categorical variables. In the chi-square method first the frequencies are
determined if no relationship exist between the two variables, second it quantifies the
extent to which the observed distribution differs from the distribution determined
in the first step. The chi-square test is used for ranking features as well.
The chi-square method is used in different ways [7, 43, 44] for intrusion detection.
we have used this method to select the best set of features. All the 41 features
of the KDD dataset are ranked to determine the best subset. The highest ranked
feature indicates that the feature is the most relevant feature for the connection.
The chi-square method to rank the features is given as follows:
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1. A table is created with the frequencies of values for each attribute class.
2. Expected value of each attribute is calculated with the following formula:
EV =
class count of the value ∗ values count of that class
total number of instances
(6.1)
3. The chi-square value for that attribute is calculated as follows:
ChiV al (attribute) =
v∑
k=1
c∑
m=1
ChiCell(expectedk,l) (6.2)
4. Chicell is calculated as follows:
diff ∗ diff
expected
(6.3)
Where diff = expected− value frequency
The ranked features based on chi-square are shown in table 6.1
Attacks SN Chi-Square Ranking
back 1 6, 5, 13, 10, 41, 40, 28, 27, 4, 24, 23, 37, 3, 35, 33, 34, 31, 12, 36, 2,
32, 38, 39, 1, 30, 29, 22, 16, 25, 19, 7, 21, 18, 17, 26, 20, 9, 11, 15, 8,
14
buffer
overflow
2 10, 14, 13, 17, 1, 3, 5, 32, 33, 36, 6, 37, 24, 23, 35, 34, 31, 12, 4, 2, 22,
7, 21, 28, 29, 9, 8, 39, 40, 41, 38, 30, 20, 16, 19, 18, 11, 27, 15, 26, 25
ftp write 3 3, 9, 35, 32, 19, 17, 36, 22, 33, 23, 2, 4, 12, 7, 21, 10, 8, 37, 13, 11, 34,
40, 1, 41, 6, 38, 39, 5, 27, 29, 28, 26, 24, 25, 16, 14, 15, 30, 20, 31, 18
guess
passwd
4 6, 5, 11, 40, 10, 4, 41, 39, 38, 3, 27, 28, 33, 32, 12, 36, 23, 24, 37, 35,
34, 31, 2, 22, 7, 21, 25, 20, 8, 30, 1, 26, 29, 14, 13, 16, 15, 19, 9, 17, 18
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imap 5 3, 26, 4, 31, 28, 39, 24, 38, 25, 33, 5, 36, 32, 12, 37, 2, 22, 7, 21, 8, 30,
11, 9, 10, 40, 1, 41, 6, 35, 34, 19, 18, 23, 20, 27, 14, 29, 13, 17, 15, 16
ipsweep 6 37, 5, 3, 2, 32, 36, 31, 6, 35, 12, 33, 23, 24, 40, 34, 41, 28, 27, 4, 1, 38,
39, 30, 29, 26, 25, 10, 22, 16, 19, 13, 17, 14, 15, 11, 7, 21, 20, 8, 18, 9
land 7 7, 38, 39, 26, 4, 25, 3, 37, 32, 5, 36, 33, 31, 6, 24, 12, 23, 2, 22, 21, 29,
30, 10, 8, 9, 41, 1, 34, 40, 35, 18, 17, 27, 19, 20, 13, 11, 28, 16, 14, 15
loadmodule 8 18, 14, 17, 37, 3, 32, 36, 10, 33, 2, 12, 4, 22, 7, 21, 35, 8, 9, 13, 11, 34,
40, 1, 41, 6, 38, 39, 5, 23, 28, 27, 26, 24, 25, 16, 31, 15, 19, 20, 30, 29
multihop 9 18, 17, 16, 13, 14, 33, 10, 3, 36, 32, 22, 23, 2, 12, 4, 7, 21, 9, 38, 8, 35,
37, 11, 40, 1, 41, 6, 39, 5, 27, 19, 20, 24, 26, 25, 15, 34, 31, 28, 30, 29
neptune 10 30, 29, 4, 5, 3, 35, 34, 39, 38, 26, 25, 23, 33, 6, 12, 36, 32, 37, 24, 31,
41, 2, 40, 27, 28, 1, 10, 22, 16, 13, 19, 17, 14, 15, 11, 18, 7, 21, 20, 8, 9
nmap 11 5, 3, 37, 2, 36, 4, 39, 32, 6, 35, 31, 26, 38, 25, 33, 12, 23, 24, 34, 1, 40,
41, 28, 30, 27, 29, 10, 22, 16, 13, 19, 17, 14, 7, 21, 18, 20, 9, 8, 15, 11
perl 12 16, 18, 17, 14, 3, 33, 34, 12, 2, 4, 22, 7, 21, 10, 8, 9, 13, 36, 11, 37, 40,
1, 41, 6, 38, 39, 5, 24, 29, 23, 27, 28, 25, 26, 32, 15, 35, 20, 30, 31, 19
phf 13 10, 14, 19, 3, 12, 2, 4, 22, 7, 21, 11, 9, 37, 35, 15, 36, 13, 40, 39, 1, 41,
38, 8, 5, 6, 26, 27, 24, 25, 30, 31, 28, 29, 18, 34, 16, 17, 32, 23, 20, 33
pod 14 8, 5, 3, 37, 2, 33, 31, 36, 38, 32, 6, 35, 12, 24, 34, 23, 40, 1, 41, 39, 30,
29, 4, 28, 27, 26, 25, 22, 7, 21, 17, 16, 20, 18, 19, 10, 13, 11, 15, 9, 14
portsweep 15 4, 41, 3, 5, 34, 27, 33, 35, 28, 40, 1, 36, 6, 30, 29, 12, 23, 24, 37, 25,
32, 39, 31, 38, 2, 26, 10, 22, 16, 13, 19, 17, 14, 15, 7, 21, 18, 20, 8, 11,
9
rootkit 16 9, 16, 17, 3, 13, 14, 33, 11, 34, 1, 24, 23, 12, 2, 4, 22, 7, 21, 8, 37, 35,
36, 10, 39, 41, 40, 6, 38, 5, 20, 18, 19, 25, 27, 26, 30, 32, 31, 28, 15, 29
satan 17 29, 5, 35, 30, 27, 3, 40, 34, 25, 33, 38, 23, 41 , 4, 6, 28, 12, 32, 36, 37,
24, 31, 39, 2, 26, 1, 10, 22, 16, 19, 13, 17, 14, 15, 7, 21, 18, 20, 8, 11, 9
smurf 18 5, 3, 2, 24, 23, 36, 6, 12, 35, 37, 32, 40, 31, 33, 34, 38, 1, 41, 39, 30,
29, 4, 28, 27, 26, 25, 10, 22, 16, 13, 19, 17, 14, 15, 7, 21, 18, 20, 8, 11,
9
spy 19 38, 39, 18, 15, 3, 2, 12, 4, 22, 7, 21, 11, 9, 10, 14, 34, 35, 13, 40, 37, 1,
41, 36, 8, 5, 6, 26, 24, 25, 29, 30, 27, 28, 33, 19, 16, 17, 31, 23, 20, 32
teardrop 20 8, 5, 3, 24, 38, 25, 40, 23, 30, 36, 29, 27, 34, 6, 35, 2, 33, 12, 37, 32,
31, 1, 41, 39, 4, 28, 26, 10, 22, 16, 19, 7, 21, 17, 20, 18, 11, 9, 15, 13,
14
warez
client
21 5, 10, 6, 3, 1, 36, 22, 37, 33, 32, 24, 23, 35, 40, 38, 39, 31, 34, 12, 2,
41, 30, 4, 28, 29, 27, 25, 26, 16, 19, 7, 21, 17, 15, 20, 18, 9, 11, 14, 8,
13
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warezmaster 22 6, 1, 36, 5, 3, 33, 32, 24, 12, 23, 37, 22, 31, 2, 4, 7, 21, 9, 30, 8, 29, 10,
11, 39, 41, 40, 34, 38, 35, 28, 19, 20, 25, 27, 26, 15, 13, 14, 18, 16, 17
Table 6.1: Feature Ranking with Chi-Square
6.2.2 Filtered Attribute Evaluation Method
The information gain of an attribute “x”with respect to the class attribute “y”is the
reduction in uncertainty about the class Y when the value of x is known. Informa-
tion gain attribute evaluator is used to evaluate the features of the KDD training
set. It evaluates the worth of a feature or attribute based on the information gain
with respect to the class. The information gain ranks the attribute based on the
separating classes of the training samples. The rank of an attributed is calculated
using equation 6.4
InformationGain = Dx −D−x (6.4)
where Dx is the information which includes attribute x and D−x is the informa-
tion which excludes the attribute x. The information is calculated using the entropy
equation 6.5:
Entropy =
j∑
i=1
pi log pi (6.5)
The ranked features based on filtered attribute evaluator are shown in table 6.2
Attacks SN FAE Ranking
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back 1 6, 5, 13, 10, 41, 40, 28, 27, 4, 24, 23, 37, 3, 35, 33, 34, 31, 12, 36, 2,
32, 38, 39, 1, 30, 29, 22, 16, 25, 19, 7, 21, 18, 17, 26, 20, 9, 11, 15, 8,
14
buffer
overflow
2 10, 14, 13, 17, 1, 3, 5, 32, 33, 36, 6, 37, 24, 23, 35, 34, 31, 12, 4, 2, 22,
7, 21, 28, 29, 9, 8, 39, 40, 41, 38, 30, 20, 16, 19, 18, 11, 27, 15, 26, 25
ftp write 3 3, 9, 35, 32, 19, 17, 36, 22, 33, 23, 2, 4, 12, 7, 21, 10, 8, 37, 13, 11, 34,
40, 1, 41, 6, 38, 39, 5, 27, 29, 28, 26, 24, 25, 16, 14, 15, 30, 20, 31, 18
guess
passwd
4 6, 5, 11, 40, 10, 4, 41, 39, 38, 3, 27, 28, 33, 32, 12, 36, 23, 24, 37, 35,
34, 31, 2, 22, 7, 21, 25, 20, 8, 30, 1, 26, 29, 14, 13, 16, 15, 19, 9, 17, 18
imap 5 3, 26, 4, 31, 28, 39, 24, 38, 25, 33, 5, 36, 32, 12, 37, 2, 22, 7, 21, 8, 30,
11, 9, 10, 40, 1, 41, 6, 35, 34, 19, 18, 23, 20, 27, 14, 29, 13, 17, 15, 16
ipsweep 6 37, 5, 3, 2, 32, 36, 31, 6, 35, 12, 33, 23, 24, 40, 34, 41, 28, 27, 4, 1, 38,
39, 30, 29, 26, 25, 10, 22, 16, 19, 13, 17, 14, 15, 11, 7, 21, 20, 8, 18, 9
land 7 7, 38, 39, 26, 4, 25, 3, 37, 32, 5, 36, 33, 31, 6, 24, 12, 23, 2, 22, 21, 29,
30, 10, 8, 9, 41, 1, 34, 40, 35, 18, 17, 27, 19, 20, 13, 11, 28, 16, 14, 15
loadmodule 8 18, 14, 17, 37, 3, 32, 36, 10, 33, 2, 12, 4, 22, 7, 21, 35, 8, 9, 13, 11, 34,
40, 1, 41, 6, 38, 39, 5, 23, 28, 27, 26, 24, 25, 16, 31, 15, 19, 20, 30, 29
multihop 9 18, 17, 16, 13, 14, 33, 10, 3, 36, 32, 22, 23, 2, 12, 4, 7, 21, 9, 38, 8, 35,
37, 11, 40, 1, 41, 6, 39, 5, 27, 19, 20, 24, 26, 25, 15, 34, 31, 28, 30, 29
neptune 10 30, 29, 4, 5, 3, 35, 34, 39, 38, 26, 25, 23, 33, 6, 12, 36, 32, 37, 24, 31,
41, 2, 40, 27, 28, 1, 10, 22, 16, 13, 19, 17, 14, 15, 11, 18, 7, 21, 20, 8, 9
nmap 11 5, 3, 37, 2, 36, 4, 39, 32, 6, 35, 31, 26, 38, 25, 33, 12, 23, 24, 34, 1, 40,
41, 28, 30, 27, 29, 10, 22, 16, 13, 19, 17, 14, 7, 21, 18, 20, 9, 8, 15, 11
perl 12 16, 18, 17, 14, 3, 33, 34, 12, 2, 4, 22, 7, 21, 10, 8, 9, 13, 36, 11, 37, 40,
1, 41, 6, 38, 39, 5, 24, 29, 23, 27, 28, 25, 26, 32, 15, 35, 20, 30, 31, 19
phf 13 10, 14, 19, 3, 12, 2, 4, 22, 7, 21, 11, 9, 37, 35, 15, 36, 13, 40, 39, 1, 41,
38, 8, 5, 6, 26, 27, 24, 25, 30, 31, 28, 29, 18, 34, 16, 17, 32, 23, 20, 33
pod 14 8, 5, 3, 37, 2, 33, 31, 36, 38, 32, 6, 35, 12, 24, 34, 23, 40, 1, 41, 39, 30,
29, 4, 28, 27, 26, 25, 22, 7, 21, 17, 16, 20, 18, 19, 10, 13, 11, 15, 9, 14
portsweep 15 4, 41, 3, 5, 34, 27, 33, 35, 28, 40, 1, 36, 6, 30, 29, 12, 23, 24, 37, 25,
32, 39, 31, 38, 2, 26, 10, 22, 16, 13, 19, 17, 14, 15, 7, 21, 18, 20, 8, 11,
9
rootkit 16 9, 16, 17, 3, 13, 14, 33, 11, 34, 1, 24, 23, 12, 2, 4, 22, 7, 21, 8, 37, 35,
36, 10, 39, 41, 40, 6, 38, 5, 20, 18, 19, 25, 27, 26, 30, 32, 31, 28, 15, 29
satan 17 29, 5, 35, 30, 27, 3, 40, 34, 25, 33, 38, 23, 41 , 4, 6, 28, 12, 32, 36, 37,
24, 31, 39, 2, 26, 1, 10, 22, 16, 19, 13, 17, 14, 15, 7, 21, 18, 20, 8, 11, 9
smurf 18 5, 3, 2, 24, 23, 36, 6, 12, 35, 37, 32, 40, 31, 33, 34, 38, 1, 41, 39, 30,
29, 4, 28, 27, 26, 25, 10, 22, 16, 13, 19, 17, 14, 15, 7, 21, 18, 20, 8, 11,
9
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spy 19 38, 39, 18, 15, 3, 2, 12, 4, 22, 7, 21, 11, 9, 10, 14, 34, 35, 13, 40, 37, 1,
41, 36, 8, 5, 6, 26, 24, 25, 29, 30, 27, 28, 33, 19, 16, 17, 31, 23, 20, 32
teardrop 20 8, 5, 3, 24, 38, 25, 40, 23, 30, 36, 29, 27, 34, 6, 35, 2, 33, 12, 37, 32,
31, 1, 41, 39, 4, 28, 26, 10, 22, 16, 19, 7, 21, 17, 20, 18, 11, 9, 15, 13,
14
warez
client
21 5, 10, 6, 3, 1, 36, 22, 37, 33, 32, 24, 23, 35, 40, 38, 39, 31, 34, 12, 2,
41, 30, 4, 28, 29, 27, 25, 26, 16, 19, 7, 21, 17, 15, 20, 18, 9, 11, 14, 8,
13
warezmaster 22 6, 1, 36, 5, 3, 33, 32, 24, 12, 23, 37, 22, 31, 2, 4, 7, 21, 9, 30, 8, 29, 10,
11, 39, 41, 40, 34, 38, 35, 28, 19, 20, 25, 27, 26, 15, 13, 14, 18, 16, 17
Table 6.2: Feature Ranking with Filtered Attribute eval-
uator
6.2.3 Simulation and Results
All the attacks were individually treated and ranking methods were applied by
comparing them with the normal connections. This was done to identify features
which differentiate an attack from the normal connections. All the experiments for
ranking the features were performed using the WEKA 3.6 data-mining tool. The
attacks and the normal connection were provided to the tool in an “arff”file (file
format for weka) and the tool provided the results.
For the results a technique proposed by Dr. Zubair Baig was employed to determine
the effect of varying the number of features on the detection rate and false alarms
rate. Another objective of this simulation was to determine the optimal number of
features for detection of each attack. The simulation was carried out by decreasing
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the number of features. The first simulation was done with all the important features
indicated by the ranking algorithm. The importance of a features is indicated its
value. Any feature with a non zero value is considered relevant. The number of
features was reduced by 10% for every simulation and the effect was observed on
the number of true positive and false positives obtained. True positive (TP) is the
count of malicious connections correctly detected/classified and False positive (FP)
is the count of normal connections classified as attacks.
The results in the figures 6.1 to figure 6.10 are plotted in terms of percentages in
order to avoid the gap between the attacks with large number of connections and
small number of connections. The results are plotted for all the 22 attacks where
TP represents the percentage of true positives and FP shows the percentage of false
positives. A complete analysis of these results is provided later in the section.
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Figure 6.1: TP and FP rates with Full feature set
Figure 6.2: TP and FP rates with 90% feature set
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Figure 6.3: TP and FP rates with 80% feature set
Figure 6.4: TP and FP rates with 70% feature set
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Figure 6.5: TP and FP rates with 60% feature set
Figure 6.6: TP and FP rates with 50% feature set
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Figure 6.7: TP and FP rates with 40% feature set
Figure 6.8: TP and FP rates with 30% feature set
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Figure 6.9: TP and FP rates with 20% feature set
Figure 6.10: TP and FP rates with 10% feature set
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6.2.4 Analysis
The results for the feature selection indicate that with a higher number of features,
the true positive detection rate is low for most of the attacks and also the false
positive percentage is low. But, as the number of features is decreased we see a
remarkable increase in the true positive detection rate.
A similar trend is observed in the results with half of the features selected. As the
number of features is reduced further beyond 50%, the number of false positives
start to increase. The results with only 10% of the features selected show the max-
imum detection rate for attacks belonging to Denial of service and Probe classes of
attacks.
The true positive detection rate is low throughout the simulation for U2R and R2L
attacks mainly because of the difference in the samples of training and test set data.
It can also be observed that different attacks show maximum detection rates with
different number of features. For example loadmodule shows a maximum true pos-
itive detection rate of 100% with 90% of the feature subset selected, and with the
feature set of less than 50% the TP detection rate is high but the FP detection
is very high which is not a good sign for the efficiency of the intrusion detection
system.
Similarly it can be seen that back and smurf attacks have better TP detection rates
with lesser number of features. But with smaller number of features the FP rate is
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Figure 6.11: Comparison of TP rates for DoS attacks using Ranking method
very high for U2R class attacks. For R2L attacks not a single connection is detected
based on the features selected using feature ranking methods.
It is inferred from the simulation that different type of attacks have good TP detec-
tion rates with different number of features.
A comparison of TP for the DoS, probe and U2R attacks is shown in figure 6.11,
6.12 and 6.13 respectively. Whereas the FP comparison for DoS, probe and U2R
attacks is shown in figure 6.14, 6.15, 6.16 and 6.17 respectively.
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Figure 6.12: Comparison of U2R TP percentage using Ranking method
Figure 6.13: Comparison of Probe TP percentage using Ranking method
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Figure 6.14: Comparison of DoS FP percentage using Ranking method
Figure 6.15: Comparison of Probe FP percentage using Ranking method
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Figure 6.16: Comparison of U2R TP percentage using Ranking method
Figure 6.17: Comparison of R2L FP percentage using Ranking method
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6.3 Subset Evaluation Methods
As compared to attribute evaluation method, subset evaluation methods calculate
the relevance of a subset of features with respect to the class. The main aim of these
methods is to create a feature subset that replaces the complete feature set for that
class.
6.3.1 Filtered Subset Evaluator
The filtered subset evaluator works on the same principle as filtered attribute evalu-
ator but the difference is that it selects a number of attributes to form the subset of
features and then evaluates their efficiency in predicting the class of the connection.
6.3.1.1 Simulation and Results
The complete training data-set was evaluated by the Filtered subset Evaluator us-
ing WEKA 3.6 data mining tool. Two simulations were performed. In the first
simulation all the attacks were individually compared with the normal connection
in order to determine the subset of features which differentiate them from normal
connections. The selected subset of features for every attack by comparing it with
normal connection is shown in table 6.3
SN Attack Differentiating features
1 back 5, 10, 13
2 buffer overflow 14
3 ftp write 9
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4 guess passwd 11
5 imap 26, 39
6 ipsweep 5
7 land 7
8 loadmodule 18
9 multihop 16,18
10 neptune 4,5,6,12,25,26,29,30,35,38,39
11 nmap 2,5,6,26,31,36,37,39
12 perl 18
13 phf 14
14 pod 8
15 portsweep 4,5,6,27,28,33,34,40,41
16 rootkit 9
17 satan 5,25,27,29,30
18 smurf 2, 5, 6
19 spy 15, 18, 39
20 teardrop 8
21 warezclient 10
22 warezmaster 6
Table 6.3: Selected feature subset with Filtered Subset
Evaluator
The objective of second simulation was to identify features which distinguish
different malicious connections from each other and from normal connections as well.
In this simulation, all the attacks were simultaneously provided to the evaluator.
Table 6.4 shows the feature subset by comparing the complete training data-set
with the normal connections.
Attack Selected features
Complete data-set 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 8, 10, 12, 23, 25, 29, 30, 35, 36, 37, 38, 39, 40
Table 6.4: Selected feature subset for complete data-set
using FSE
The results of the first simulation are summarized in table 6.5 and are plotted in
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figure 6.18 and 6.19 where as the results of the second simulation are summarized
in table 6.6 and the detection comparison is shown in fig 6.20 and 6.21
6.3.1.2 Analysis
The results of the simulation for filtered subset evaluator feature selection method
show good TP detection for Denial of service and probe class of attacks. The
percentage of false positives is also low for these classes. For U2R and R2L classes,
the TP detection percentage is good but the FP percentage is mostly 100%. It
means that the rules generated using are detecting a good percentage of attacks but
they are classifying all the normal connections as attacks, which by no means is an
acceptable solution.
By analyzing the feature subset for DoS and Probe classes it is clear that a number
of features are selected for each of the attacks. On the other hand for U2R and
R2L classes, for most of the attacks a single feature is selected. This supports the
argument that we made in section 6.2.4 about these classes.
For the second simulation with the complete dataset no particular class show a
remarkable TP detection percentage with the exception of ipsweep and imap.
From the results, it can be said that TP detection rate can be maximized by using a
minimum number of correctly selected features. The minimum number of features
are different for every attack and the results also show that if only a single feature is
selected, a good TP detection percentage is over shadowed by a worst FP detection
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percentage.
To achieve the objective of maximizing the TP detection rate it is necessary to select
features as per the class of every attack and a tradeoff should be made for selecting
the features which maximizes the TP detection percentage and minimizes the FP
detection percentage.
SN Attack TP FP
1 back 94.42896936 0
2 buffer overflow 100 100
3 ftp write 100 100
4 guess passwd 100 99.9691072
5 imap 100 96.03542375
6 ipsweep 100 1.760889713
7 land 100 0
8 loadmodule 100 100
9 multihop 83.33333333 99.9279168
10 neptune 81.68348722 0
11 nmap 80.82191781 0
12 perl 100 0
13 phf 50 0.185356812
14 pod 100 99.61898878
15 portsweep 73.24840764 0.31922562
16 rootkit 92.30769231 100
17 satan 48.43537415 2.090412934
18 smurf 56.84210526 0
19 spy 0 0
20 teardrop 100 0.535475234
21 warezclient 0 99.90732159
22 warezmaster 0 0.051488003
Table 6.5: TP and FP percentage for Filtered Subset
Evaluator Simulation 1
The results of the first simulation are summarized in table 6.5 and are plotted in
figure 6.18 and 6.19 where as the results of the second simulation are summarized
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in table 6.6 and the detection comparison is shown in fig 6.20 and 6.21
Figure 6.18: TP detection rate for entire dataset using FSE Simulation 1
SN Attack TP % FP %
1 back 19.49860724 0
2 buffer overflow 0 0
3 ftp write 0 0
4 guess passwd 0 0
5 imap 98.58156028 0
6 ipsweep 100 1.760889713
7 land 57.14285714 0
8 loadmodule 0 0
9 multihop 0 0
10 neptune 11.89607043 0
11 nmap 2.739726027 0
12 perl 0 0
13 phf 0 0
14 pod 60.97560976 0.123571208
15 portsweep 15.92356688 0
16 rootkit 0 0
17 satan 1.224489796 0
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18 smurf 0 0
19 spy 0 0
20 teardrop 25 0.092678406
21 warezclient 0 0
22 warezmaster 0 0
Table 6.6: TP and FP percentage for Filtered Subset
Evaluator Simulation 2
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Figure 6.19: FP detection rate for entire dataset using FSE Simulation 1
Figure 6.20: TP detection rate for entire dataset using FSE Simulation 2
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Figure 6.21: FP detection rate for entire dataset using FSE Simulation 2
Chapter 7
Chromosome Modelling for
Intrusion Detection
7.1 Modelling of Malicious Code/Attacks
The internet today is the main cause of spreading of malicious software throughout
the world. Viruses, worms, etc are the major forms of these malicious software.
With millions of computers connected together and enormous amount of data ex-
changed between them these viruses spread very quickly. One of the solutions to
stop spreading of these viruses and worms is through intrusion detection and pre-
vention systems.
For any intrusion detection system to detect these attacks successfully it is required
that the system should possess knowledge on detecting them. A number of such
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techniques have been discussed in chapter 3.
Most of the intrusion detection systems are based on signature and rely of the match-
ing of these signatures to detect intrusions. Reverse engineering can be applied in
development of these signatures so that a higher detection rate can be achieved. In
reverse engineering of these attacks, each and every step of the malicious software’s
activity can be tracked and the extent of damage can be studied and a mechanism
can be develop to counter them. A complete description of methods for identifying
vulnerabilities in a computer system and how reverse engineering can be applied to
deal with these malicious softwares is provided in [45].
The proposed scheme is based on the modelling of intrusion-based attacks through
genetic chromosomes, and their subsequent evolution for detecting both known as
well as unknown malicious attacks. The attacks are modelled as chromosomes
through feature selection and ranking methods, namely, Chi-square and Filtered
attribute evaluation and Filtered Subset evaluation techniques. These technique
use statistical analysis to determine a subset of features with the best predictive
ability. Finally the best subset of features is selected by comparing attack signa-
tures obtained, with the normal connections and through the selection of the least
number of features with the highest detection ability. A fitness function is used to
measure the goodness of a attack chromosome. Chromosomes with higher fitness
values have a high probability of being selected for crossover to generate offspring
attack chromosomes through which newer attacks can be detected. A mutation in-
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troduces random changes in the chromosome to explore the possibility of variation
of known attacks
7.2 Genetic Algorithm and Intrusion Detection
Genetic algorithm is a powerful domain independent search technique based on prin-
ciples of evolution and natural selection. Genetic algorithm is generally applied to
the optimization problems where the problem is solved using the a application de-
pendent fitness function.
For network intrusion detection with genetic algorithm the “Michigan approach”is
selected. In this approach a single chromosome represent a signature or a rule to
detect a single attack.A number of these rules will be required for the detection of
all the attacks in the data-set. The fitness function evaluates how well a chromo-
some detects attack and treats normal connections. As the objective clearly states
that detection rate of attacks should be maximized where as detection of normal
connection as attacks should be minimized. The fitness function being used is taken
from [10] and is stated in equation 7.1
α
A
− β
B
(7.1)
where α (alpha) is the number of connections correctly classified as attacks, β (beta)
is the number of normal connections classified incorrectly as attack, A is the number
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of attacks of that type and B is the number of normal connections.
7.3 Simulation Setup
The aim of the simulation was to reverse engineer malicious connections (attacks)
in the training set to extract the features and create a chromosome for each attack
which is able to detect the same attack in the testing set with the objective of
maximizing the true positives and minimizing the false positives.
All the attacks were separately reverse engineered in comparison with the normal
connections to generate the attack masks. Attack masks were used to create the
attack chromosomes. Only a subset of attack chromosome was provided as input to
the search block, this subset was used as initial population by the genetic algorithm
was and was evolved using the genetic operators; crossover and mutation.
7.4 Results and Analysis
The results are documented separately for four classes of attacks in the NSL-KDD
dataset. Each attack was reverse engineered by comparing the anomalous connection
and a normal connection of the similar kind to analyze the difference between them.
The parameters which differentiated the two connections were selected for attack
detection. The aim was to select the minimum number of features.
For each attack a number of simulations were performed. In each simulation a
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different initial population was provided as input and the result was observed over
200 generations on average.
7.4.1 Denial of Service Attacks
7.4.1.1 Smurf
Different samples of the smurf attack and similar normal connections are shown in
table 7.1. By reverse engineering, it was determined that the smurf attack specifi-
cally occurs with connection parameters of icmp as a protocol, ecr i as a service and
SF as a flag and only with source bytes of 520 and 1032. So source bytes becomes
the malicious differentiator as they have different values in the normal connections.
Connection
Features
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 to 41
Smurf 0 icmp ecr i SF 1032 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 80 80 0 0
0 0 1 0 0 255 255 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 smurf
Smurf 0 icmp ecr i SF 520 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 252 252
0 0 0 0 1 0 0 255 255 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0
smurf
Normal 0 icmp ecr i SF 1480 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 4 0 0 0
0 1 0 0.5 2 4 1 0 1 0.5 0 0 0 0 normal
Normal 0 icmp ecr i SF 40008 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 3 0 0
0 0 1 0 0 138 4 0.03 0.06 0.03 0 0 0 0 0
normal
Chromosome X icmp ecr i SF Y 0 X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X
X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X
X X smurf
Table 7.1: Chromosome construction for Smurf
The detection behavior of smurf attack with genetic algorithm and reverse engi-
neered features is shown in figure 7.1. The two chromosomes have different values of
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Y as in the table 7.1 were provided initially to the system and have the detection of
378 smurf connections. But with the genetic algorithm the final detection is of 665
smurf connections in the test set. It is because the test set contains some different
variations of the smurf attack which were recognized using the mutation operator.
Figure 7.1: Detection of Smurf attack with genetic algorithm
7.4.1.2 Teardrop
A number of samples of the teardrop attack and similar normal connections are
shown in table 7.2. By reverse engineering it was determined that the teardrop
attack specifically occurs with connection parameters of udp as a protocol, private
as a service and SF as a flag and only with source bytes of 28. So source bytes
becomes the malicious differentiator field as they have different values in the normal
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connections.
Connection
Features
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 to 41
Teardrop 0 udp private SF 28 0 0 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 10 10 0
0 0 0 1 0 0 35 10 0.29 0.11 0.29 0 0 0 0
0 teardrop
Teardrop 0 udp private SF 28 0 0 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 44 44 0
0 0 0 1 0 0 64 44 0.69 0.05 0.69 0 0 0 0
0 teardrop
Normal 0 udp private SF 46 48 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 45 45 0
0 0 0 1 0 0 255 254 1 0.01 0.17 0 0 0 0
0 normal
Normal 0 udp private SF 53 55 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 509 509
0 0 0 0 1 0 0 255 255 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0
normal
Chromosome X udp private SF 28 0 X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X
X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X
X X teardrop
Table 7.2: Chromosome construction for Teardrop
Figure 7.2: Detection of Teardrop attack with genetic algorithm
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The detection behavior of teardrop attack with genetic algorithm and reverse
engineered features is shown in figure 7.2. The number of detections (true positives)
for teardrop remain the same throughout the 200 generations as the instances are
exactly the same as the chromosomes provided as initial population and there are
also no variations of this attack in the test set. Different runs of the algorithm
with different initial population resulted in the same conclusion. With chromosome
constructed 37 false positives were also detected.
7.4.1.3 Land
A number of samples of the land attack and similar normal connections are shown
in table 7.3. The most prominent feature of the land attack is that it has the same
source and destination IP address, which is indicated in the KDD data set by the
land field. But to ensure that the number of false positives are minimized, by reverse
engineering it was observed for the fields like tcp for protocol, telnet or finger for
service and S0 for flag, source and destination bytes 0 and the land field of 1. So
the land field becomes the malicious differentiator field as all the normal connections
have 0 for this field.
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Connection
Features
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 to 41
Land 0 tcp finger S0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 2 1
1 0 0 1 0 1 255 1 0 0.02 0 0 0 1 0
0 land
Land 0 tcp telnet S0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 2 1
1 0 0 1 0 1 1 3 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 land
Normal 0 tcp finger SF 8 220 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1
0 0 0 0 1 0 0 147 9 0.04 0.04 0.01
0.22 0 0 0 0 normal
Normal 214 tcp telnet SF 167 4647 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1
0 0 0 0 1 0 0 255 1 0 0.01 0 0 0 0
0.01 0 normal
Chromosome X tcp finger
telnet
SF 0 0 1 X X X X X X X X X X X X X X
X X X X X X X X X X X X X X
X X X X X land
Table 7.3: Chromosome construction for Land
The detection behavior of teardrop attack with genetic algorithm and reverse
engineered features is shown in figure 7.3. The number of detections (true positives)
for land attack remain the same throughout the 200 generations as the instances are
exactly the same as the chromosomes provided in the initial population. No false
alarms are generated in the detection of this attack.
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Figure 7.3: Detection of Land attack with genetic algorithm
7.4.1.4 Ping Of Death (POD)
Different samples of the pod attack and similar normal connections are shown in
table 7.4. By reverse engineering it was determined that the pod attack can be
detected by selecting parameters of icmp as a protocol, ecr i or tim i as a service
and SF as a flag and source bytes of 1480 and 564 and the destination bytes of 0.
For the pod attack, the source bytes along with protocol and flag are the malicious
differentiator fields as they have different values in the normal connections.
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Connection
Features
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 to 41
Pod 0 icmp ecr i SF 1480 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 3 0 0 0
0 1 0 0.67 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 pod
Pod 0 icmp tim i SF 564 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 2 0 0 0
0 1 0 0 2 2 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 pod
Normal 0 icmp ecr i SF 1480 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 4 0 0 0
0 1 0 0.5 2 4 1 0 1 0.5 0 0 0 0 normal
Normal 0 icmp ecr i SF 40008 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 3 0 0
0 0 1 0 0 138 4 0.03 0.06 0.03 0 0 0 0 0
normal
Chromosome X icmp ecr i
tim i
SF Y 0 X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X
X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X
X X pod
Table 7.4: Chromosome construction for Pod
The genetic algorithm shows no enhancement in the detection of pod attacks and
also in minimizing the number of false positive as a total of 16 normal connections
were detected as pod connections where as the other technique have a lower detection
rate. The behavior is shown if figure 7.4.
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Figure 7.4: Detection of Ping of Death attack with genetic algorithm
7.4.1.5 Back
The connection describing features for the back attack include tcp for protocol,
http for service, SF or RSTR for flag and the source and destination bytes are
the malicious differentiator with the specific values of 54540, 8314 and 33580, 2920
respectively. The Y in the chromosome in table 7.5 indicates that this field can take
several values which are shown in the chromosomes for the detection of this attack.
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Connection
Features
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 to 41
Back 0 tcp http SF 54540 8314 0 0 0 2 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 4 18 0 0 0
0 1 0 0.11 255 255 1 0 0 0 0 0 0.07 0.07
back
Back 0 tcp http RSTR 39240 7300 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 2 0 0
0.5 0.5 1 0 0 255 239 0.94 0.01 0 0 0 0
0.03 0.03 back
Back 0 tcp http RSTR 33580 2920 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 2 0 0
0.5 0.5 1 0 0 255 254 1 0.01 0 0 0 0 0.07
0.07 back
Normal 0 tcp http SF 209 3376 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 12 0 0
0 0 1 0 0.25 255 255 1 0 0 0 0.01 0.01 0
0 normal
Normal 0 tcp http SF 353 1986 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 7 7 0 0 0
0 1 0 0 255 255 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 normal
Chromosome X tcp http SF
RSTR
Y Y X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X
X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X
X X back
Table 7.5: Chromosome construction for Back
Figure 7.5 shows the improvement in the number of detections for the back attack
with genetic algorithm. The mutation helps in developing of new chromosomes which
lead to further detection of this attack as there are a number of variations for this
attack.
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Figure 7.5: Detection of Back attack with genetic algorithm
7.4.1.6 apache2
The apache2 attack is also a form of denial of service attack which was not found in
the training set but has a good number of instances in the test set. This attack was
detected as a result of cross over between the back attack and neptune attack in one
of the simulations. The detection was later confirmed by analyzing the results and
the resulting offsprings. The chromosome contrustion example for the detection of
apache2 attack is given in table 7.6
A total of 245 apache2 connections were positively detected by the intrusion
detection system and the new mutation operator further detected 482 connections
of apache2. So from a total of 727 out of 737 apache2 attacks were detected in this
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Connection
Features
1 to 3 4 to 41
Back X tcp http RSTR 54540 8314 0 0 X X X X X X X
X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X
X X X X X X X X X X
Neptune 0 tcp private S0 0 0 X X X X X X X X X X X X X
X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X
X X X X
OffSpring1 (Apache2) X tcp http S0 0 0 X X X X X X X X X X X X X
X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X
X X X X
OffSpring2 0 tcp private RSTR 54540 8314 0 0 X X X X X X X
X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X
X X X X X X X X X X
Table 7.6: Apache2 chromosome construction
way as a number of variations were found with the service field for this attack.
7.4.1.7 Neptune
The neptune attack has a lot different variations in the connection describing fea-
tures. But through reverse engineering it was analyzed that the source and the
destination bytes have a very low value for neptune connections. They are either 0
or 1. So the chromosome was constructed for neptune attack along with its samples
and similar normal connections are shown in table 7.7
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Connection
Features
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 to 41
Neptune 0 tcp private REJ 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 256
19 0 0 1 1 0.07 0.06 0 68 2 0.03 0.1
0.01 0 0 0 1 1 neptune
Neptune 0 tcp Imap4 REJ 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 239
14 0 0 1 1 0.06 0.07 0 255 14 0.05
0.07 0 0 0 0 1 1 neptune
Neptune 0 tcp telnet RSTO 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 259
11 0 0 1 1 0.04 0.07 0 255 11 0.04
0.07 0 0 0 0 1 1 neptune
Neptune 0 tcp time S0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 145
1 1 1 0 0 0.01 0.1 0 255 1 0 0.09 0
0 1 1 0 0 neptune
Neptune 0 tcp netbios ns S0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 120
12 1 1 0 0 0.1 0.06 0 255 12 0.05
0.05 0 0 1 1 0 0 neptune
Normal 0 tcp time SF 0 4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0
0 0 1 0 0 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 normal
Normal 0 tcp telnet SF 129 179 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1
0 0 0 0 1 0 0 255 2 0.01 0.02 0 0 0
0 0 0 normal
Normal 0 tcp http SF 306 2239 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 6 6
0 0 0 0 1 0 0 255 233 0.91 0.02 0 0
0 0 0.02 0 normal
Chromosome X tcp Y Y 1/0 0 X X X X X X X X X X X X X X
X X X X X X X X X X X X X X
X X X X X neptune
Table 7.7: Chromosome construction for Neptune
The detection behavior of a neptune attack is depicted in figure 7.6. The neptune
attack has many variations and for the detection of this attack a very limited number
of chromosomes are provided as the initial population and with the help of mutation
and crossover the detection percentage reaches upto 99% which is illustrated in the
results. This improvement in the detection rate is due to the detection of variation
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of the neptune attack as there are many different instances with different values for
the service field.
Figure 7.6: Detection of Neptune attack with genetic algorithm
7.4.2 Probe
The probe class of attack have shown a good detection percentage with the pattern
based chromosomes because these attacks have constant patterns. Threshold based
chromosomes also result in similar detection rate. The satan attack show the best
performance in the probe class as with its chromosomes a number os attacks are also
detected which were not provided in the initial population. The only problem in the
detection of this class of attack is their similarity with the normal connections that
is why there is always some number of false positives detected with the malicious
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connections.
7.4.2.1 Ipsweep
A number of sample connections of IPsweep attack and similar normal connections
are shown is table 7.8. By reverse engineering the features of the attack in compari-
son with the normal connections the chromosome for the IPsweep is depicted in the
table 7.8
From the training set, there were 45 different chromosomes generated for the
detection of the ipsweep attack. But when the genetic algorithm was used on all
these chromosomes, only two chromosomes were found with positive fitness at the
end. The rest of the chromosome had 0 fitness value, which indicated that only two
samples of ipsweep were found in the test set. The two successful chromosomes were
1. X icmp eco i SF 18 0 X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X
X X X X X X X X X X X X ipsweep
2. X icmp eco i SF 8 0 X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X
X X X X X X X X X X X X ipsweep
The results are shown in figure 7.7
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Connection
Features
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 to 41
IPsweep 0 icmp eco i SF 18 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1
0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 16 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 0
ipsweep
IPsweep 0 icmp eco i SF 8 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
44 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 95 1 0 1 0.51 0
0 0 0 ipsweep
IPsweep 0 tcp private REJ 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1
0 0 1 1 1 0 0 27 2 0.04 1 0.04 1 0
0 0.89 1 ipsweep
IPsweep 0 tcp ssh RSTO 0 15 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1
0 0 1 1 1 0 0 3 2 0.33 1 0.33 1 0 0
1 0.5 ipsweep
Normal 0 tcp private REJ 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 56 3
0.02 0.33 0.98 0.67 0.05 0.82 0 65
3 0.05 0.74 0.86 0 0.02 0.33 0.85
0.67 normal
Normal 0 icmp eco i SF 30 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 1
0 0 0 0 0.5 1 0 255 1 0 0.01 0 0 0
0 0 0 normal
Normal 0 icmp eco i SF 10008 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 2
0 0 0 0 1 0 0 255 28 0.11 0.02 0.19
0 0 0 0 0 normal
Chromosome X icmp eco i SF 18/8 0 X X X X X X X X X X X X X X
X X X X X X X X X X X X X X
X X X X X X X ipsweep
Chromosome X tcp Y SF 0 0 X X X X X X X X X X X X X X
X X X X X X X X X X X X X X
X X X X X X X ipsweep
Table 7.8: Chromosome construction for IPsweep
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Figure 7.7: Detection of Ipsweep attack with genetic algorithm
7.4.2.2 Portsweep
A portsweep attack is quite similar to ipsweep attack. The reverse engineered chro-
mosomes along with several samples of the portsweep attack and similar normal
connections are shown is table 7.9. It can be observed that the selected feature set
is similar to ipsweep.
The detection of portsweep attack with genetic algorithm is shown in figure 7.8.
As there are different variations of this attack it can be seen that with the runs of
genetic algorithm the number of detections is increased and we end up with complete
detection of this attack. The new chromosomes generated through both crossover
and mutation detect new instances of this attack. Another point to be noted here
is the similarity of the normal connection and the attack in the features selected.
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Connection
Features
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 to 41
Portsweep 0 tcp private REJ 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 1
0 0 1 1 0.5 1 0 255 1 0 0.48 0.46 0
0 0 0.47 1 portsweep
Portsweep 0 tcp other RSTR 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1
0 0 1 1 1 0 0 255 1 0 0.72 1 0 0 0
1 1 portsweep
Portsweep 0 tcp ctf RSTR 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1
0 0 1 1 1 0 0 182 1 0.01 0.46 0.46
0 0 0 0.46 1 portsweep
Normal 0 tcp other RSTR 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1
0 0 1 1 1 0 0 255 1 0 0.58 0.56 0 0
0 0.56 1 normal
Normal 0 tcp private REJ 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 45
2 0 0 1 1 0.04 0.91 0 54 2 0.04 0.8
0.83 0 0 0 0.83 1 normal
Normal 3 tcp private RSTR 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 143
2 0 0 1 1 0.01 0.55 0 150 2 0.01
0.52 0.95 0 0 0 0.95 1 normal
Chromosome X tcp Y Y 0 0 X X X X X X X X X X X X X X
X X X X X X X X X X X X X X
X X X X X X X portsweep
Table 7.9: Chromosome construction for Portsweep
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Several different combinations were tried to create a difference but with no success.
So it was decided to keep the least number of features which maximized the true
positive detection. The number of false positive also increased with with the number
of generations which is shown in figure 7.9. The number of false positives generated
is still very low.
Figure 7.8: Detection of Portsweep attack with genetic algorithm
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Figure 7.9: FP for Portsweep attack with genetic algorithm
7.4.2.3 Nmap
A comparison of nmap attacks and similar normal connections is shown in table
7.10. It can be seen that for nmap attacks, the first six fields are quite different
from the normal connections and they differentiate the anomalous connections from
normal connection very well. The SH value in the flag field is only found in the
nmap connection, and hence it is the only parameter which can be said to present
the anomaly differentiator instead of the whole flag field. The detection behavior of
the nmap is shown in figure 7.10. The chromosome detecting most of the attacks
was the following
X tcp private SH 0 0 X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X
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X X X X X X X X X X X nmap
In one of the simulations, it was not initially provided and was generated as a
result of a crossover between an nmap connection and a normal connection. The
example is illustrated below where — indicates the cut point.
X tcp finger—SH 0 0 X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X
X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X nmap
X tcp private—SF 21 0 X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X
X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X normal
X tcp private SH 0 0 X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X
X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X nmap
X tcp finger SF 21 0 X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X
X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X Anomaly
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Connection
Features
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 to 41
Nmap 0 icmp eco i SF 8 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 4
0 0 0 0 1 0 1 2 202 1 0 1 0.25 0 0
0 0 nmap
Nmap 0 tcp private SH 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1
1 1 0 0 1 0 0 249 1 0 0.96 0.97 0
0.97 1 0 0 nmap
Nmap 0 icmp eco i SF 8 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 2
0 0 0 0 1 0 1 3 39 1 0 1 0.26 0 0 0
0 nmap
Normal 0 icmp eco i SF 30 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1
0 0 0 0 1 0 0 18 18 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0
normal
Normal 0 udp private SF 105 145 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 3
0 0 0 0 1 0 0 255 254 1 0.01 0.01
0 0 0 0 0 normal
Chromosome X tcp private SH 0 0 X X X X X X X X X X X X X X
X X X X X X X X X X X X X X
X X X X X X X nmap
Chromosome X icmp eco i SF 8 0 X X X X X X X X X X X X X X
X X X X X X X X X X X X X X
X X X X X X X nmap
Table 7.10: Chromosome construction for Nmap
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Figure 7.10: Detection of Nmap attack with genetic algorithm
7.4.2.4 Satan
Table 7.11 shows the chromosomes construction steps for satan by comparing it with
the normal traffic.
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Satan 0 udp private SF 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 44 8 0 0 0 0 0.18 0.09 0
255 58 0.23 0.21 1 0 0 0 0 0
Satan 0 tcp private REJ 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 511 1 0.08 0 0.9 1 0 1 0
255 1 0 1 0 0 0.09 0 0.86 1
Satan 0 tcp gopher SF 6 77 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 2 1 0 0 0 0 0.5 1 0 255 1 0
0.02 0 0 0 0 0 0
Normal 0 udp private SF 105 146 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 229 217
0.95 0.01 0 0 0 0 0 0
Normal 3030 udp other SF 147 105 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 2 2 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 255 2
0.01 0.74 0.97 0 0 0 0 0
Chromo
some
X tcp private REJ 0 0 X X X X X X X X X X X
X X X X X X X X X X X
X X X X X X X X X X X
X X satan
Chromo
some
X tcp other REJ 0 0 X X X X X X X X X X X
X X X X X X X X X X X
X X X X X X X X X X X
X X satan
Chromo
some
X tcp/udp Y SF/REJ Y Y X X X X X X X X X X X
X X X X X X X X X X X
X X X X X X X X X X X
X X satan
Table 7.11: Chromosome Construction for Satan
7.4.3 R2L
The problem in the detection of R2L attacks using pattern based chromosomes is
the the difference in the connections specifications in the training and the testing
sets. This is the reason why the attribute evaluation based methods and subset
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evaluation based methods fail to generate a feature subset which results in a good
true positive detection. Threshold based methods also fail to improve the detection
rate.
7.4.3.1 Ftp write
Different samples of ftp write connections and similar normal connections are shown
in table 7.12.
Connect.
Features
1 2 3 4 5 to 11 12 13 14 15 to 41
Ftp
write
32 tcp ftp SF 104 449
0 0 0 2 0
1 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 1 1 0 0
0 0 1 0 0 1 1 1 0 1 0 0
0 0 0
Ftp
write
0 tcp ftp
data
SF 613 0 0
0 0 0 0
1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 2 0
0 0 0 1 0 1 1 84 1 0 1
0.02 0 0 0 0
Ftp
write
67 tcp login SF 157
2703 0 0
1 0 0
1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0
0 0 1 0 0 2 1 0.5 1 0.5
0 0 0 0 0
Normal 0 tcp ftp
data
SF 3720 0 0
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0
0 0 1 0 0 125 20 0.16
0.03 0.16 0 0 0 0 0
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Normal 21 tcp ftp SF 241 772
0 0 0 4 0
1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 2 2 0 0
0 0 1 0 0 255 90 0.35
0.02 0 0 0 0 0.01 0
Chromo
some
X tcp ftp
data
SF X X X
X X X
X
1 X 0 X X X X X X X X X
X X X X X X X X X
X X X X X X X X X
ftp write
Chromo
some
X tcp login SF X X X
X X X
X
1 X 0 X X X X X X X X X
X X X X X X X X X
X X X X X X X X X
ftp write
Table 7.12: Chromosome construction for ftp write
The detection behavior of the ftp write attack with reverse engineered features
and genetic algorithm is shown in figure 7.11. It has been observed that almost
all the malicious connections are detected and the number of false positives ranged
from a minimum of 0 to a maximum of 365. The threshold based search yielded a
similar result.
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Figure 7.11: Detection of Ftp write attack with genetic algorithm
7.4.3.2 Warezmaster
A number of samples of warezmaster attack, similar normal network connections
and the constructed chromosomes are shown in table 7.13. Warezmaster attack
occur with ftp connections both in the control control connections and the data
connections. For this attack the logged in field in control ftp connection is 1
whereas in the data connection the same field is equal to 0.
Connect.
Features
1 2 3 4 5 6 to 11 12 13 to 41
Warez
master
0 tcp ftp SF 36 197 0 0 0 0
0
1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 0
0 1 0 0 255 1 0 0.05 0 0 0.39
0 0.05 0
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Warez
master
156 tcp ftp SF 950 2551 0 0 0
18 0
1 0 0 0 0 21 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 0
0 1 0 0 218 1 0 0.03 0 0 0.01
0 0.07 0
Warez
master
9 tcp ftp
data
SF 0 5150836 0
0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0
0 0 1 0 0 6 6 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0
Warez
master
10 tcp ftp
data
SF 0 5151385 0
0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0
0 0 1 0 0 5 5 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0
Warez
master
9 tcp ftp
data
SF 0 5151049 0
0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0
0 0 1 0 0 13 13 1 0 1 0 0 0 0
0
Warez
master
9 tcp ftp
data
SF 0 5153771 0
0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0
0 0 1 0 0 12 12 1 0 1 0 0 0 0
0
Normal 0 tcp ftp
data
SF 641 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 2 0
0 0 0 0.67 0.67 0 71 76 0.23
0.07 0.23 0.03 0 0 0 0
Normal 0 tcp ftp
data
SF 3720 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0
0 0 0 1 0 0 125 20 0.16 0.03
0.16 0 0 0 0 0
Normal 21 tcp ftp SF 241 772 0 0 0 4 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 2 2 0 0
0 0 1 0 0 255 90 0.35 0.02 0
0 0 0 0.01 0
Chromo
some
X tcp ftp SF Y 197 X X X
X X
1 X X X X X X X X X X X
X X X X X X X X X X X
X X X X X warezmaster
Chromo
some
X tcp ftp
data
SF 0 X X X X X 0 X X X X X X X X X X X
X X X X X X X X X X X
X X X X X warezmaster
Table 7.13: Chromosome construction for Warezmaster
The detection of warezmaster with reverse engineered features and genetic al-
gorithm showed a detection of 512 true positives and 35 false positives with the
pattern based search. Most of the warezmaster connections with ftp data connec-
tion were detected as they they consistently had the source bytes value of 0. On
the other hand the connection with the ftp service were not detected remarkably.
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The threshold based search yielded a similar result for data connections whereas it
showed a good detection of ftp connections but with false positives of around 60%
as the minimum value was selected and a lot of normal connections were incorrectly
classified as warezmaster attacks.
Another important point was observed that for almost all the warezmaster connec-
tion based on ftp data connections were detected by threshold search as they had
large values as destination bytes without being logged in.
7.4.3.3 Warezclient
No instances of warezclient attack were found in the test set. As this attack is quite
similar to warezmaster attack its detection behavior is considered to be the same as
the warezmaster attack.
7.4.3.4 Phf
A number of sample connection the phf attack and matching normal connections
are shown in table7.14. This is the only attack in R2L category which has proper
pattern as it can be seen from the connection table.
No phf connections were found in the test but the generated chromosomes were
tested on the traing set itself and it a perfect detection and no false alarms were
generated. It means that the chromosomes generated were accurate for the detection
of phf attack.
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Connect.
Features
1 2 3 4 5 6 7-9 10 -
14
15-
18
19 20 - 41
phf 0 tcp http SF 51 8127 0 0
0
2 0
1 0
1
0 0
0 0
1 0 0 0 1 2 0 0 0
0.5 1 0 1 255
255 1 0 0 0 0
0 0 0
phf 1 tcp http SF 51 8127 0 0
0
2 0
1 0
1
0 0
0 0
1 0 0 0 1 1 0 0
0 0 1 0 0 255
246 0.96 0.01
0 0 0 0 0 0
phf 6 tcp http SF 51 8127 0 0
0
2 0
1 0
1
0 0
0 0
1 0 0 0 1 1 0 0
0 0 1 0 0 255
249 0.98 0.01
0 0 0 0 0 0
phf 0 tcp http SF 51 8127 0 0
0
2 0
1 0
1
0 0
0 0
1 0 0 0 1 1 0 0
0 0 1 0 0 255
241 0.95 0.01
0 0 0 0 0 0
Normal 0 tcp http SF 23 8153 0 0
0
0 0
1 0
0
0 0
0 0
0 0 0 0 5 5 0.2
0.2 0 0 1 0
0 30 255 1 0
0.03 0.04 0.03
0.01 0 0.01
Normal 0 tcp http SF 20 2790 0 0
0
0 0
1 0
0
0 0
0 0
0 0 0 0 10 27 0 0
0 0 1 0 0.11 48
255 1 0 0.02
0.09 0 0 0 0
Normal 0 tcp http SF 306 403 0 0
0
0 0
1 0
0
0 0
0 0
0 0 0 0 38 38 0
0 0 0 1 0 0 38
255 1 0 0.03
0.02 0 0 0 0
Chromo
some
X tcp http SF 51 8127 X X
X
2 X
1 X
1
X X
X X
1 X X X X X X
X X X X X X
X X X X X X
X X X X phf
Table 7.14: Chromosome construction for Phf
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7.4.3.5 Guess Passwd
The guess password attack proved to be the most difficult attack to detect in the
R2L category. The main reason for this is the difference between the instances in
the training and the testing set. The example is shown in table 7.15
Dataset Features
Train 0 tcp telnet RSTO 125 179 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 0 0
4 4 1 0 0.25 0 0.25 0.25 0.75 0.75
Train 23 tcp telnet SF 104 276 0 0 0 0 5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 2
1 0 1 1 0 0 0 0
Test 0 tcp ftp SF 26 157 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 233 118
0.51 0.03 0 0 0 0 0 0
Test 1 tcp pop 3 RSTR 15 46 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 255
219 0.86 0.02 0 0 0 0 0.04 0.01
Test 60 tcp telnet S3 120 188 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 255
254 1 0.01 0 0 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02
Test 0 tcp telnet SF 124 174 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 255
197 0.77 0.02 0 0 0 0 0.02 0.03
Table 7.15: Guess passwd Connection comparison
The pattern based chromosomes were not able to detect a single guess passwd
connection in the test set due to the above mentioned reasons and also a false positive
percentage of 0.144 was observed with pattern based chromosomes.
Threshold based chromosomes resulted in a detection rate of over 90% but with the
false poitives of about 20% and also a misclassification of 13% was observed.
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7.4.4 U2R
The problem with the detection of U2R class of attacks is that such attacks happen
when the a normal user tries to gain root access using some commands. But the
NSL KDD dataset only contains values and not any command so both the pattern
based chromosomes and threshold based chromosomes fail to detect any entry for
perl, rootkit and multihop attacks in the test set. U2R attacks which show some
detection with the proposed technique are described below:
7.4.4.1 Buffer overflow
A number of samples of buffer overflow attacks and similar normal connections are
shown in table 7.16. This attack has two connection defining parameters “tcp,ftp data,SF
”and “tcp,telnet,SF ”but the 12th and 14th fields of logged in and root shell re-
ally differentiate them from normal connections. But in the dataset there are some
of the malicious connections which have the same values like normal connections
and are the reason of a number of false positives in the detection of buffer overflow
attack. The true positive detection of buffer overflow attack is shown in figure 7.12
and the detection of false positives is shown in figure 7.13. The mutation operator
is helpful in increasing the true positive detection on the indicated malicious dif-
ferentiator fields but it also increases the false positives detected. Only 2 different
instances of the buffer overflow attacks are found in the test set.
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Figure 7.12: Detection of Buffer overflow attack with genetic algorithm
Figure 7.13: FP from Buffer overflow attack with genetic algorithm
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7.4.4.2 Loadmodule
A number of sample loadmodule connections and similar normal connections are
shown in table 7.17. It can be seen that loadmodule is described by three connection
defining parameter subsets “tcp,ftp,SF”, “tcp,ftp data,SF”and “tcp,telnet,SF ”. The
source bytes value of 0 seems to be the malicious differentiator with tcp,telnet,SF.
The su root value is set for all the Loadmodule connections which the major mali-
cious differentiator of this category.
Cnnction
Features
1 2 3 4 5 6 to
11
12 13 14 15 to 41
Load
Module
79 tcp telnet SF 281 1301
0 0 0
2 0
1 1 1 0 0 4 2 0 0 0 0 1
1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1
10 1 0 1 0.3 0 0 0
0.1
Load
Module
103 tcp telnet SF 302 8876
0 0 0
2 0
1 4 1 0 3 4 2 1 0 0 0 1
1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1
1 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0
Load
Module
7 tcp ftp SF 230 644 0
0 0 4
0
1 0 0 0 0 4 0 0 0 0 0 1
1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 4
1 0.25 0.75 0.25
0 0 0 0 0
Load
Module
0 tcp ftp
data
SF 0 5921
0 0 0
0 0
1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2
1 0 0 0 0 0.5 1 0
1 3 1 0 1 0.67 0 0
0 0
Load
Module
0 tcp ftp
data
SF 0 2072
0 0 0
1 0
1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 4
3 0 0 0 0 0.75 0.5
0 3 5 1 0 1 0.4 0
0 0 0
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Normal 657 tcp telnet SF 648 21257
0 0 0
0 0
1 5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
1 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0
255 60 0.24 0.02
0 0 0.79 0.85 0.01
0.03
Normal 140 tcp telnet SF 177 27162
0 0 0
0 0
1 6 1 0 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1
0 0 0 0 1 0 0 223
1 0 0.02 0 0 0 0 0
0
Normal 22 tcp ftp SF 241 771 0
0 0 4
0
1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1
0 0 0 0 1 0 0 244
68 0.28 0.02 0 0
0 0 0.01 0
Normal 18 tcp ftp SF 177 554 0
0 0 3
0
1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1
0 0 0 0 1 0 0 244
61 0.25 0.03 0 0
0 0 0 0
Normal 0 tcp ftp
data
SF 1766 0 0 0
0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2
2 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 19
52 0.53 0.11 0.53
0.06 0 0 0 0
Normal 0 tcp ftp
data
SF 641 0 0 0
0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 2
0 0 0 0 0.67 0.67
0 71 76 0.23 0.07
0.23 0.03 0 0 0 0
Chromo
some
X tcp ftp
data
SF 0 X X
X X
X X
1 X 1 X X X X X X X
X X X X X X X
X X X X X X X
X X X X X X
Chromo
some
X tcp telnet SF 281 1301
X X
X X
X
1 X 1 X X X X X X X
X X X X X X X
X X X X X X X
X X X X X X
Chromo
some
X tcp ftp SF 230 644
X X
X X
X
1 X 0 X X X X X X X
X X X X X X X
X X X X X X X
X X X X X X
Table 7.17: Chromosome construction for Loadmodule
The detection behavior of loadmodule by reverse engineered features showed
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Figure 7.14: Average fitness for DoS attacks
very bad results, As with the pattern based chromosomes not a single loadmodule
connection in the test set was detected. On the other hand with threshold based
chromosomes 2 correct detection were found along with 2 false negatives and 22
false positives. The genetic algorithm had no effect in increasing the detection rate
or reducing the false alarms.
7.4.5 Fitness Analysis
It can be seen from the figure 7.14 and 7.15 that the average fitness of the population
increases for denial of service and probe class of attacks as newer attacks are detected.
For U2R and R2L class of attack no major improvement of increase in the average
fitness is observed.
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Figure 7.15: Average fitness for Probe attacks
If the number of false negatives are also included in the fitness function then the
equation 7.1 takes the form:
α
A
− β
B
− γ
C
(7.2)
α
A
− ( β
B
+
γ
C
) (7.3)
where α (alpha) is the number of connections correctly classified as attacks, β (beta)
is the number of normal connections classified incorrectly as attack and γ(gamma)
is the number of attacks incorrectly classified as different attacks. A is the number
of attacks of that type and B is the number of normal connections and C is the
total number of false negatives possible. It was observed that by accounting for
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false negatives in the fitness does effect the detection rate for DoS attacks as there is
no false negative detected. For probe attacks only portsweep showed the detection
of some false negatives but the the value was so small that it can be considered
negligible. For U2R and R2L attacks a similar trend was observed.
7.5 Comparative Analysis
In this section we analyze the results of implemented feature selection techniques and
compare them with our genetic algorithm based network intrusion detection tech-
nique. As the simulation is based on different attacks so the results are documented
based on the attack category.
7.5.1 Denial of Service
If we analyze the results for denial of service attack, it can be concluded that our
proposed GA based technique detects all the smurf attack connections in the test set
whereas the other techniques only detected up to 60% of these attacks. For the back
attack, the best detection rate is shown by the ranking method but with a higher
number of false alarms, but the GA based method exhibits a lower detection rate.
For neptune attack, the detection rate is the highest with our proposed method and
the false alarm rate is also minimized. The results are similar for land attack and
teardrop attack; as the maximum detection rate and minimum false alarm rate are
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observed with our proposed GA based technique. The results for the DoS attacks
are summarized in table 7.18 and figure 7.16 and figure 7.17 shows the comparison
of detection rates for denial of service attacks.
Attack
Ranking Method
Subset Evaluation Method
GA based technique
ImprovementSimulation 1 Simulation 2
Detection False Alarm Detection False Alarm Detection False Alarm Detection False Alarm
smurf 56.84 0 56.84 0 60.12 0 100 0 39.87
back 100 2.15 94.42 0 19.49 0 91.92 0 2.15
neptune 97.68 0.32 8168 0 11.89 0 100 0.24 2.31
pod 100 0.38 100 99.61 60.97 0.12 100 0.16 0.21
teardrop 100 0.16 100 0.53 0.16 1.02 100 0.38 0
land 57.14 0 100 0 57.14 0 100 0 42.85
Table 7.18: Detection Rate(%) for DoS Attacks
Figure 7.16: Detection rate comparison for DoS attacks
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Figure 7.17: False alarm rate comparison for DoS attacks
7.5.2 Probe
For the probe class of attacks, our proposed GA based network intrusion detection
technique shows an increased detection rate for satan attack, portsweep attack, and
nmap attack. The false alarm rate for these attacks is also the minimum with our
proposed technique. The maximum detection rate for ipsweep is observed with all
the techniques, but our proposed scheme shows a lower false alarm rate as compared
to the filtered subset evaluation, and a higher false alarm rate compared to the
ranking method. Overall, our proposed GA method shows a higher detection rate
and a lower false alarm rate. The results for probe class of attacks are summarized
in table 7.19 and figure 7.18 and figure 7.19 show the comparison plots.
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Attack
Ranking Method
Subset Evaluation Method
GA based technique
ImprovementSimulation 1 Simulation 2
Detection False Alarm Detection False Alarm Detection False Alarm Detection False Alarm
satan 57.41 0.46 48.43 2.09 1.22 0 83.94 1.64 26.53
portsweep 98.08 5.87 73.24 0.31 15.92 0 99.36 0.61 1.27
ipsweep 100 0.78 100 1.76 98.58 0 100 1.00 0.75
nmap 82.19 0 80.82 0 2.73 0 100 0 17.80
Table 7.19: Detection Rate(%) for Probe Attacks
Figure 7.18: Detection rate comparison for Probe attacks
7.5.3 User to Root (U2R)
In the U2R attacks, an attacker tries to exploit the system vulnerabilities by exe-
cuting commands. The KDD dataset only contain values, and therefore these U2R
attacks are hard to detect with only the values from the dataset. The detection
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Figure 7.19: False alarm rate comparison for Probe attacks
rates for buffer overflow attack and perl attack are higher as compared to other
techniques, and also the false alarms for these attacks are lower with our proposed
technique. The rootkit attack was not detected by our proposed technique but it
also shows no false alarms, which are higher with all the other techniques. The
reason for this behavior was the absence of a symmetric behavior as the instances
in the training and the test sets are different for this attack so it is difficult for the
system to detect attacks in the test set based of rules developed from the training
set. Similar results are shown for the multihop attack as well. The results for the
U2R attacks are summarized in table 7.20 and figure 7.20 and figure 7.21 shows the
comparison of results.
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Attack
Ranking Method
Subset Evaluation Method
GA based technique
ImprovementSimulation 1 Simulation 2
Detection False Alarm Detection False Alarm Detection False Alarm Detection False Alarm
rootkit 1.21 99.93 92.30 100 0 0 0 0 0
buffer
overflow
60 99.61 100 100 0 0 90 0.89 30
perl 50 0 0 0 0 0 100 0.41 50
loadmodule 100 100 100 100 0 0 34.19 5.78 94.21
multihop 88.88 99.97 83.33 99.92 0 0 12.34 11.12 88.85
Table 7.20: Detection Rate(%) for U2R Attacks
Figure 7.20: Detection rate comparison for U2R attacks
7.5.4 Remote to Local (R2L)
Our proposed GA based method showed a higher detection rate for warezmaster
attack with an increased false alarm rate as compared to other techniques. The
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Figure 7.21: False alarm rate comparison for U2R attacks
maximum detection rate of less than 2% was found for the warezmaster attack with
ranking method, but our proposed method shows a detection rate of 54%. A good
detection rate is also shown for guess passwd attack with a very low false alarm rate
with our proposed technique. A smaller number of false positives are observed for
ftp write attack. For phf attack a higher detection rate and a lower false positive
rate is observed. Table 7.21 show the results for R2L attacks, figure 7.22 and figure
7.23 show the comparison of techniques.
127
Attack
Ranking Method
Subset Evaluation Method
GA based technique
ImprovementSimulation 1 Simulation 2
Detection False Alarm Detection False Alarm Detection False Alarm Detection False Alarm
warezmaster 1.90 0.051 0 0.051 0 0 54.23 5.12 52.33
guess
passwd
0 0 100 99.96 0 0 62.14 0.14 62.14
ftp write 0 3.78 100 100 0 0 100 3.75 0.03
phf 50 0.03 50 0.18 0 0 72.14 0 22.14
Table 7.21: Detection Rate(%) for R2L Attacks
Figure 7.22: Detection rate comparison for R2L attacks
128
Figure 7.23: False alarm rate comparison for R2L attacks
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Cnnction
Features
1 2 3 4 5 to 11 12 13 14 15 to 41
Buffer
overflow
0 tcp ftp data SF 0 5696 0 0
0 0 0
1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0
0 0 0 1 0 0 1 81 1 0
1 0.02 0 0 0 0
Buffer
overflow
290 tcp telnet SF 415 70529
0 0 0 3 0
1 4 0 0 4 4 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0
0 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 1 0 1
0 0 0 0 0
Normal 49 tcp telnet SF 2402 3939
0 0 0 40
1 2 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0
0 0 0 1 0 0 1 2 1 0 1
1 0 0 0 0
Normal 0 tcp ftp data SF 16196 0 0
0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1
0 0 0 0 1 0 0 31 22
0.26 0.1 0.26 0.14 0
0 0 0
Normal 0 tcp ftp data SF 3136 0 0 0
0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 2
0 0 0 0 1 0 0 198 63
0.32 0.04 0.32 0 0 0
0 0
Normal 39 tcp telnet SF 270 8652
0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1
0 0 0 0 1 0 0 210
25 0.12 0.08 0 0 0 0
0.01 0
Chromo
some
X tcp telnet SF X X X X
X X X
1 X 1 X X X X X X X
X X X X X X X
X X X X X X X
X X X X X X
buffer overflow
Chromo
some
X tcp ftp data SF X X X X
X X X
1 X 0 X X X X X X X
X X X X X X X
X X X X X X X
X X X X X X
buffer overflow
Chromo
some
X tcp telnet SF X X X X
X X X
1 X 1 X X X X X X X
X X X X X X X
X X X X X X X
X X X X X X
buffer overflow
Chromo
some
X tcp ftp data SF X X X X
X X X
1 X 1 X X X X X X X
X X X X X X X
X X X X X X X
X X X X X X
buffer overflow
Table 7.16: Chromosome Construction for buffer overflow
Chapter 8
Conclusion and Future Work
8.1 Conclusion
In this thesis work I have presented a network intrusion detection system based on
genetic algorithm. The objective of the system is to enhance the detection of attacks
while reducing the number of false alarms. Genetic algorithm is an iterative heuris-
tic based on the process of natural selection and evolution. A reverse engineering
based feature selection method is used for selecting the appropriate features for gen-
erating chromosomes for detection of attacks in the data set. These chromosomes
are provided as initial population to the system along with a number of instances
of other attacks and normal connections. The system proceeds by evolving these
chromosomes using genetic operators crossover and mutation. The detection rates
of all these attacks were analyzed on 200 generations of the algorithm. The system
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shows excellent detection rate for denial of service and probe classes of attacks and
good results for u2r and r2l categories.
The proposed scheme is also capable of detecting variants of known anomalous con-
nections and also some other unknown attacks.
The three parameters of intrusion detection systems are also enhanced in the pro-
posed scheme Speed of the system is directly related to the the number of compar-
isons it takes on rule to detect a connection for being anomalous. As all the attacks
are detected with the least number of features so it can be said the the proposed
scheme is quick in detecting attacks.
Accuracy is quite high for denial of service and probes classes and is good for u2r
and r2l.
The system is self adaptable for new attacks in some cases just the chromosome is
needed for the system to detect new attacks.
8.2 Future Directions
As it was observed that the proposed scheme was able to detect attacks which are not
provided as training so it is possible that the scheme can be used for the detection of
zero day attacks. But to ensure that this provides good results the data set should
be expanded to include all the attacks that are known today.
Intrusion detection systems need to be updated for new attacks so new research
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methods and different algorithms can be applied for the solution of this problem.
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Dataset Description
KDD99 dataset is among the widely used datsets used to verify the performances of
intrusion detection systems.A complete description of the dataset is provided in [52,
18]. The dataset describes each network connection on the basis of 41 parameters.
These include parameters are based on the following
1. Intrinsic parameters: These are the basic parameters and are directly extracted
from the headers. Table 1 shows the intrinsic feature of the dataset.
No. Feature
name
Description Type Value
1 duration length (number of seconds) of the con-
nection
continuous Integer
2 protocol
type
type of the protocol, e.g. tcp, udp, etc. discrete Symbolic
3 service network service on the destination, e.g.,
http, telnet, etc.
discrete Symbolic
4 flag normal or error status of the connection discrete Symbolic
5 source
bytes
number of data bytes from source to
destination
continuous Integer
6 dest. bytes number of data bytes from destination
to source
continuous Integer
7 land 1 if connection is from/to the same
host/port; 0 otherwise
discrete Binary
8 wrong
fragment
number of ‘wrong’fragments continuous Integer
9 urgent number of urgent packets continuous Integer
Table 1: Intrinsic Features
2. Content based parameters: These parameters are extracted from the contents
of the network packets and are based on domain knowledge. Table 2 lists the
content based features of the dataset
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No. Feature
name
Description Type Value
10 hot number of hot indicators continuous Integer
11 num failed
logins
number of failed login attempts continuous Integer
12 logged in 1 if successfully logged in; 0 otherwise discrete Binary
13 num com-
promised
number of compromised conditions continuous Integer
14 root shell 1 if root shell is obtained; 0 otherwise discrete Binary
15 su at-
tempted
1 if su root command attempted; 0
otherwise
discrete Binary
16 num root number of root accesses continuous Integer
17 num file
creations
number of file creation operations continuous Integer
18 num shells number of shell prompts continuous Integer
19 num access
files
number of operations on access control
files
continuous Integer
20 num out-
bound
cmds
number of outbound commands in an
ftp session
continuous Integer
21 is hot login 1 if the login belongs to the hot list; 0
otherwise
discrete Binary
22 is guest lo-
gin
1 if the login is a guest login; 0 other-
wise
discrete Binary
Table 2: Content based Features
3. Traffic based parameters: These parameters are calculated by considered a
number previous connections as well. This category can be further classified
into two sub groups.
(a) Time traffic features: The parameters are defined based on a 2 minute
time window. Table 3 show time based traffic features.
(b) Machine traffic features: These parameters are defined based on the num-
ber of connections to the same machine. Table 4 show time based traffic
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features.
No. Feature
name
Description Type Value
23 count no. of connections to the same host as
the current connection in the past two
seconds (same host)
continuous Integer
24 serror rate % of connections that have SYN errors continuous Float
25 rerror rate % of connections that have REJ errors continuous Float
26 same srv
rate
% of connections to the same service continuous Float
27 diff srv
rate
% of connections to different services continuous Integer
28 srv count number of connections to the same ser-
vice as the current connection in the
past two seconds
continuous Integer
29 srv serror
rate
% of connections that have SYN errors continuous Float
30 srv rerror
rate
% of connections that have REJ errors continuous Float
31 srv diff
host rate
% of connections to different hosts continuous Float
Table 3: Traffic(time) based Features
4. Class: Class indicates the type of the connection. Normal indicates that the
connection is of normal traffic. Any other value indicates that the connection
is anomalous. The KDD99 dataset comprises of four classes of attacks namely
denial of servic, probe, r2l and u2r.
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No. Feature
name
Description Type Value
32 dst host
count
No. of connections to the same desti-
nation IP address
Continuous Integer
33 dst host
srv count
No. of connections to the same desti-
nation port
Continuous Integer
34 dst host
same srv
rate
% of connections that were to the same
service, among the connections aggre-
gated in dst host count (32)
Continuous Float
35 dst host
diff srv
rate
% of connections that were to different
services, among the connections aggre-
gated in dst host count (32)
Continuous Float
36 dst host
same src
port rate
% of of connections that were to the
same source port, among the connec-
tions aggregated in dst host srv count
(33)
Continuous Float
37 dst host
srv diff
host rate
% of connections that were to differ-
ent destination machines, among the
connections aggregated in dst host srv
count (33)
Continuous Float
38 dst host
serror rate
% of connections that have activated
the flag (4) s0, s1, s2 or s3, among
the connections aggregated in dst host
count (32)
Continuous Float
39 dst host
srv serror
rate
% of connections that have activated
the flag (4) s0, s1, s2 or s3, among the
connections aggregated in dst host srv
count (33)
Continuous Float
40 dst host
rerror rate
% of connections that have activated
the flag (4) REJ, among the connec-
tions aggregated in dst host count (32)
Continuous Float
41 dst host
srv error
rate
% of connections that have activated
the flag (4) REJ, among the connec-
tions aggregated in dst host srv count
(33)
Continuous Float
Table 4: Traffic(Machine) based Features
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